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ABSTRACT
We review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence.
After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect
information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of
improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the
"Samaritan's Dilemma", pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents,
and political economy considerations.  Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent
preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs, but that
some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also
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Moral philosophers have reﬂected on the role of the State in bringing about a just dis-
tribution of incomes from time immemorial. An enduring puzzle concerns the reasons
why governments choose to conduct redistribution through in-kind rather than cash
programs. In virtually all countries, developed and developing, a signiﬁcant amount of
redistribution occurs in-kind. The fraction of GDP spent on these programs is remark-
ably similar across OECD countries. Moreover, this share is growing in many countries.
Hence, it behooves us to try to understand why governments choose to redistribute
in-kind, rather than in cash.1
Economists have traditionally been skeptical about in-kind transfers viewing cash
as superior in terms of the recipient’s utility: In-kind transfers constrain the behavior
of the recipients, while cash transfers do not. The traditional justiﬁcation for in-kind
transfers has been one of “paternalism”. Paternalism has diﬀerent formulations in the
literature, but one useful example involves inter-dependent preferences. If members of
society care about the situation of the poorest, then the unconstrained consumption
choices of the poorest may at times imply negative externalities for those who care for
them. Paternalistic arguments assume particular force when the intended recipient of a
transfer program is a child but the transfer goes to parents. Parents may not take full
account of the utility of their children when making decisions, or they may neglect to
factor in externalities. For example, suboptimal spending on children’s education may
lead not only to poorer individual prospects, but also to slower future economic growth.
No doubt many in-kind transfer policies have an element of paternalism to them.
But many other possible justiﬁcations for in-kind programs have been put forward
in the literature. This survey reviews these explanations, and considers the limited
empirical evidence that can be brought to bear on them. Speciﬁcally, after ﬁrst giving
1This survey ignores the issue of how in-kind transfers are to be provided, i.e. through direct public
provision or, say, mandating that individuals must consume a certain level of the good subject to
transfers. There is a vast literature on incentive issues faced by workers in the public, nonproﬁt, and
private sectors. But these issues are extraneous to the focus of our survey.
1an overview of in-kind transfer programs and reviewing the traditional paternalistic
arguments for them, we consider explanations based on imperfect information on the
part of the government and self-targeting. This leads to a more general discussion of
the issue of take up (or lack of take up) of program beneﬁts. We then discuss the
large theoretical literature that considers in-kind programs as a way of improving the
eﬃciency of the tax system. The basic idea of this literature is that taxes distort labor
supply, but that the provision of in-kind goods that are complementary to labor might
mitigate this distortion. As we shall see, it is unlikely that this is the main motivation
for most of the programs we consider; though it is possible that some in-kind transfer
programs will have larger eﬀects on long-run labor productivity and labor supply than
cash transfers. Hence, we consider a range of other possible explanations including the
“Samaritan’s Dilemma”, pecuniary eﬀects, credit constraints, asymmetric information
amongst agents, and political economy considerations.
Our survey highlights a disconnect between the theoretical and empirical work on
in-kind transfers. Many theories seem to be unmotivated by deep knowledge of the
programs, and the empirical work seems to largely accept the paternalism theory and
move on to other questions. Our own reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism
and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-
kind transfer programs, but that some of the other arguments may apply to speciﬁc
cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story.
2 A brief overview of in-kind programs
One of the most striking aspects of in-kind programs is how widespread and important
they are. Table 1 provides some evidence regarding the percent of GDP that is devoted
to ﬁve types of in-kind programs in OECD countries. The largest share of public in-
kind spending is on health care, followed by education. But child care, housing, and
active labor market programs are also important. Most countries have some form of
food subsidy program (such as a school lunch program) as well, though the OECD
does not track public expenditures on these programs so they are not included in Table
21.2 The key distinction is between unrestricted cash transfers and transfers that are
intended to provide a speciﬁc good. A key assumption in the discussion that follows is
that recipients cannot resell their allotments (at least not without substantial penalty).
This may be ensured through government enforcement or because of the nature of the
good (medical care or education). If people can resell their allocations, then the in-kind
transfer becomes, for all practical purposes, the same as cash.
Table 2 focuses on one particular type of program: demand-side housing subsidies,
and shows that many countries outside the OECD also have long-standing programs.
Evidently, it is more the norm than the exception for governments to conduct redistri-
bution in-kind.
Table 3 provides more detail about the broad range of in-kind programs in one coun-
try: The United States. The table shows a breakdown of expenditures and caseloads for
major transfer programs in the U.S. for 1980 and 2002. As Table 1 showed, U.S. public
expenditures on in-kind programs are in line with those of other countries (for instance,
although the U.S. spent 14.3% of GDP on health care in 2002, public expenditure on
health care was only 6.6%, which is quite similar to other OECD countries).
Table 3 illustrates several important points about transfers. First, total U.S. trans-
fers are dominated by transfers to the elderly under the Social Security and Medicare
programs. This is also true in other developed countries, where, as in the U.S., social
security is one of the largest transfers, and the costs of health care reﬂects dispropor-
tionate consumption by the aged. Moreover, in the U.S. about half of the spending on
Food Stamps and public housing programs also beneﬁts the elderly. It is also likely that
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction of publicly subsidized housing in other countries is occupied by the
elderly, though this breakdown is not available. This simple fact casts some doubt on
the idea that in-kind transfer programs exist primarily to inﬂuence labor supply.
Second, Americans are more likely to give cash to the elderly than to other groups.
About a third of overall transfer payments are made in cash. But if we exclude social
2In Table 1, physical provision of a good, targeted subsidy programs in which the government pays
some fraction of the market cost of the good, and vouchers, are grouped together.
3s e c u r i t y ,t h es h a r eo fa i dg i v e ni nc a s hf a l l sd r amatically. Among families with children,
very little aid is given in cash. In this respect, the U.S. is very diﬀerent than Western
European countries which typically give a larger fraction of their aid to families in cash.
Third, in the U.S., the share of aid delivered in-kind has increased over time. Much
of this increase is fueled by the rising cost of medical care delivered under the Medicare
and Medicaid programs (Medicaid being the U.S. program of public health insurance
for poor women and children, the disabled, and care for the indigent elderly that is not
covered by Medicare). However, even abstracting from this, the share delivered in-kind
has tended to increase. Between 1980 and 2002, unrestricted transfers to families with
poor children fell dramatically (partly as a result of welfare reform) while most in-kind
programs grew. Note that cash transfers made under the Earned Income Tax Program
also grew, but these transfers require recipients to work, and thus are tied transfers.
The size and importance of in-kind transfers suggest that they are an important subject
for research.
3 The traditional view of transfers
Assume preferences depend on two goods only: a composite consumption good and
a second good, which is subject to in-kind transfers. Figure 1 depicts the potential
outcomes under a food stamp program, or provision of free housing of a given size,
assuming that the resale of the transfers is not possible (at any price). The original
budget constraint is given by EF. Cash transfers shift the budget constraint upward
to E0F0; in-kind transfers of equal cost shift it to E0CF if topping up is allowed (as
with food stamps), and to EC0CF if topping up is not possible (as with free housing).
Clearly, with none of the points on CF0 being available in the case of food stamps
and, with the exception of point C, none on E0F0 available in the case of free housing,
cash weakly dominates in-kind transfers. The diagram depicts two diﬀerent types of
individuals under the food stamp program: Those who are indiﬀerent between the two
transfer schemes (individuals moving from point A to B), and those who are strictly











Figure 1: An individual’s potential choices before and after receiving food stamps or
free housing.
to point B0 under cash transfers, but are constrained to stay at point C under in-kind
transfers).3 Under the free housing program, everyone strictly prefers cash transfers
with the exception of the person who picks point C under cash transfers and thus will
be indiﬀerent between the two programs.
A particular feature of the solution under in-kind transfers, as described above, is
that it can lead to the publicly-provided good being “over-provided ” (the solution for
food at point C in Figure 1). The “paternalistic ” and “ interdependent preferences
” arguments in favor of public provision center around this feature. Overprovision
arises when the society prefers the recipients to consume more of good g than he would
voluntarily (if we were to give him a cash transfer of equivalent value), as explained
below.
3See Aaron and Von Fürstenberg (1971), among others, for a detailed explanation of the “superiority”
of cash- over in-kind transfers along this line.
53.1 Paternalism and interdependent preferences
Paternalism is intimately related to the idea of merit goods and merit wants, and may
be a key reason for government intervention. The idea was ﬁrst suggested by Musgrave
(1959); it has received diﬀerent interpretations in the literature. In one approach, the
quantity of some goods directly enters the society’s social welfare function; see Pazner
(1972). The social welfare function thus becomes “non-individualistic”. This is a general
formulation that allows for the preferences of all, or a subset of, the society’s members
to also appear as arguments of the social welfare function. It is plain that this approach
can rationalize in-kind redistribution of any good that the society considers as essential
at any desired level.
Besley (1988) criticizes the social welfare approach to paternalism, arguing that it
leads to a conﬂict with the notion of consumer sovereignty because individual preferences
are no longer respected. In Besley’s formulation, goods do not enter the social welfare
function directly. Instead, he uses a scaling approach wherein the social planner and
the individuals assign diﬀerent welfare weights to the individuals’ consumption of a
particular good.4 Thurow (1974), on the other hand, argues that there need not be a
conﬂict here because individuals may have preferences for the society that are diﬀerent
from their preferences for personal consumption.
A third approach to modeling paternalism is to allow for interdependent preferences
amongst the donors and the recipients. Under this interpretation, interdependent pref-
erences give rise to a consumption externality that may justify public provision and
the use of in-kind transfers. See the early contributions by Daly and Giertz (1972),
Garﬁnkel (1973), Amacher and Sandler (1977), and Olsen (1980).5 This approach then
allows one to preserve the individualistic property of the social welfare function.6
4See also Schroyen (2005) who questions Besley’s approach because of its implications for the tax
treatment of merit goods.
5See also Browning (1975, 1977), and Brennan and Walsh (1977, 1980), who argue against this
rationale.
6Although the contributers to this literature have at times postulated non-individualistic social wel-
fare functions in addition to interdependent preferences. For example, Browning (1981) deﬁnes pater-
nalism as when the society caters for the preferences of the donors (taxpayers), but not the transfer
recipients, while at the same time assuming that taxpayers care about the consumption of the transfer
6Suppose the rich, who are taxed to provide beneﬁts to the poor, derive utility from
seeing the poor consume certain goods (g in our discussion). It is easy to see that in
this case, the optimal in-kind transfers welfare dominate cash transfers. Assume the
rich and the poor have preferences that are represented by
uh = uh(xh,gh;gl), (1)
ul = ul(xl,gl). (2)
Let Ih,Il denote h-a n dl-types’ incomes. Denote the social weight assigned to the
utility of the rich by 0 ≤ γh ≤ 1, and to the utility of the poor by 0 ≤ γl ≤ 1, where
γh + γl =1 . First-best allocations are found by maximization of γhuh + γlul subject
to the economy’s resource constraint
P
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∂ul/∂xl = p, (3)
∂uh/∂gh
∂uh/∂xh = p. (4)
It is plain that lump-sum cash transfers cannot support such allocations. As long as





This in turn tells us that conditions (3) and (4) cannot hold simultaneously.
On the other hand, in-kind transfers support the optimal allocations (3) and (4).
Assign gh to the rich and gl to the poor, ban resale and topping up (discussed below),
and levy appropriate (diﬀerential) lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance the expenditures. It may
also be possible, depending on the properties of the optimal solution, to implement it
by providing gl to the poor, and ﬁnancing it by a tax on the rich, and letting the rich
purchase whatever amount they want in the market.7
recipients.
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7A related idea in the discussion of paternalism is the notion of “speciﬁc egalitar-
ianism”. Tobin (1970) argues that while many people have no problem with income
inequality per se, they would like to see that all individuals receive adequate food, med-
ical services or housing. This idea accords certain goods a special place not shared
by other goods. Similarly, Kelman (1986) postulates that individuals have “rights to
certain speciﬁc things, not to the cash equivalent of these things” (p. 59). These ideas
lend themselves to modeling that makes the social welfare function non-individualistic,
as well as to modeling based on interdependent preferences.
Interpret speciﬁc egalitarianism to mean an aversion to inequality in consumption
of g. One can then let gh − gl be an argument of the social welfare function or an
argument of the rich’s utility function. The latter interpretation results in a model
very much like what we have postulated here except that uh(xh,gh;gl) is replaced by
uh(xh,gh;gh − gl), with a negative relationship between uh and gh − gl.T h i si sw h a t
Gasparini and Pinto (2006) do in a recent paper in which they justify their formulation
on the basis of what they call “equal opportunity” and speciﬁc egalitarianism.8
Mulligan and Philipson (2000) argue that the paternalism argument for in-kind
transfers explains many other features of the U.S. transfer system, including the fact
that poor people both pay taxes and receive transfers. If the object of the transfer
system were only to redistribute resources, then it would be hard to understand this
feature.9 However, if the purpose of the transfer system is to shift the consumption of
the poor away from some goods and towards merit goods, then it makes more sense
One can easily establish that the optimal allocations are x
h = g
h = 200,a n dx
l = 100,g
l =1 2 5 .T h e s e
can be implemented by imposing a tax T = 125 on the rich to ﬁnance the provision of g
l =1 2 5 .T h e
recipient would be over-provided, spending all his income I
l =1 0 0on x. On the other hand, if one were
to give T =1 2 5to the poor in cash, they would spend it equally on x and g purchasing 112.5 units of
each.
8Speciﬁcally, they model equal opportunity by assuming that both the rich and the poor derive utility
from consumption goods and the quantity/quality level of eduction, but that the utility of the rich also
depends negatively on the diﬀerence between the average educational attainment of the two groups.
This makes their model indistinguishable from one with interdependent preferences (externalities). They
extend their analysis to situations where taxation is costly as well, although the costs are modeled in
an ad-hoc fashion.
9The hard to justify statement applies to tax payments per se; marginal tax rates are a basic feature
of Mirrlees model even if the tax system is purely redistributive.
8that one would tax the poor to pay for in-kind beneﬁts for the poor.
4 Imperfect information and self-targeting
Transfer programs may be universal or targeted. In universal programs, everyone is
eligible for the same level of publicly provided services. The national health insurance
provided in Canada and many European countries is a good example. In a targeted
program, the good subject to transfers is provided to a selected group of people based on
a publicly veriﬁable characteristic such as income. “Tagging” is a closely related concept
— in many programs, beneﬁts are oﬀered to a group on the basis of an immutable and
observable characteristics such as old age, youth, or disability. Universal programs will
evidently cover all needy persons, but at a cost of covering those who are not needy as
well. This cost may be considerable. In contrast, targeted programs may well miss some
needy individuals. Table 3 shows that most in-kind transfers in the U.S. are targeted
to low income individuals. The big exception is Medicare which is available to elderly
people at all income levels.
A more recent justiﬁcation for in-kind transfers is based on the idea that governments
want to target for eﬃciency reasons, but that they cannot accurately identify the poor
individuals in need of help. Hence the government must rely on individuals to identify
themselves and to indicate if they are rich or poor. If cash is oﬀered, all individuals
have an incentive to claim they are poor in order to receive it, making cash subsidies
an ineﬃcient tool. But if in-kind transfers are used as the redistributive tool, they
may serve as a separation device between the rich and the poor. This is the so-called
“self-targeting” property of public provision.
To achieve self-targeting, one must oﬀer the public a good that appeals only to the
intended recipients. In some instances, the nature of the good may suﬃce to ensure
this. In many other cases, everyone may want to consume the good subject to transfers
and one cannot rely on the nature of the good to separate those who should receive
it from those who should not. The “trick” to achieve self-targeting in these cases is
to “package” the good in such a way as to impose (otherwise unnecessary) costs on
9the recipients (actual and potential). As long as the costs are calibrated to fall more
heavily on the non-targeted group, if they choose to participate, only the targeted
group will be prepared to endure them and take up the good. The costs may be in
terms of restrictions on quantity (housing with very low square footage), or on quality
(housing, food, or education of low-quality), or on time (time-consuming application,
workfare). Alternatively, the costs may be “psychic” costs, or “stigma,” as discussed by
Moﬃtt (1983).
The logic of this idea is similar to that underlying the taxation of low-wage earners
in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal income tax problem. In that model, as is well-known, the
tax authority distorts the behavior of the low-ability people, by taxing their marginal
income, despite their being the intended beneﬁciaries of the tax system. The reason for
the distortion is that it deters high-ability people from “masquerading” or “mimicking”
the low-ability individuals. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) were the ﬁrst to apply this
idea to the provision of in-kind transfers. They argued that self-targeting could be
achieved by increasing the cost of participation in such a way as to deter those the
government does not want to participate (the rich), but not the intended recipients (the
poor). The authors pointed out that imposing costs on participation allows gains in
terms of “target eﬃciency” (i.e. achieves more redistribution), as long as the costs aﬀect
the intended recipients less than the pretenders.
A body of literature has since developed on the subject of self-targeting of publicly-
provided goods; see, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Besley and Coate (1991, 1992),
Pinto (2004), and Gahvari and Mattos (2007). The basic insight of this literature can
be captured by considering a model much simpler than Mirrlees’. Assume an economy
with two types of individuals, rich and poor. Normalize the population size to one.
Denote the rich and the poor by h and l, and the proportion of the h-a n dt h el-types
in the economy by πh and πl =1− πh. Preferences depend only on consumption, x,
and a good subject to transfers in kind, g. All goods are produced subject to a linear
technology so that the producer price of g relative to x is ﬁxed. Denote this price by p.












Figure 2: First-, second-, and third-best frontiers under conditional cash transfers.
u(·) is a smooth and strongly quasi-concave function and increasing in all its arguments.
Incomes, denoted by Ih and Ih, are exogenous.
Initial endowments allow the h-types to enjoy a higher utility level than the l-types.
This laissez-faire solution with no government intervention is depicted by point B in
Figure 2. The government aims to redistribute resources away from the h-types and
towards the l-types. If incomes were publicly observable, the government could achieve
its redistributive aims by taking money from the rich and giving it to the poor. Given
that incomes are exogenous, any redistribution achieved this way would be ﬁrst-best.
In Figure 2, AC depicts the ﬁrst-best utility possibility frontier.
In the absence of information on incomes, AC will in general be infeasible (with the
exception of point B, of course). To determine the second-best allocations, we proceed
as follows. To be most general, assume that personal consumption levels of x are not
11publicly observable. Denote the tax levied on the j-type by Tj (j = h,l); one can then
think of −Tj as the cash transfer to type j.L e t
uj ≡ u(Ij − Tj,gj), (5)
ujk ≡ u(Ij − Tk,gk),j 6= k = h,l, (6)
so that uj denotes the utility level of a j-type individual when he chooses the allocation
intended for him, and ujk when he chooses a k-type person’s bundle. Consider a direct
revelation mechanism in which the government oﬀers two “bundles” to the consumers:
(Th,gh), intended for the rich, and (Tl,gl), intended for the poor. Let γh and γl be
non-negative constants with the normalization γh + γl =1 . The second-best alloca-
tions are found by maximizing γhuh + γlul with respect to Th,Tl,gh,gl, subject to the
government’s budget constraint,
πh(Th − pgh)+πl(Tl − pgl) ≥ 0, (7)
and the incentive compatibility constraints,
uh ≥ uhl, (8)
ul ≥ ulh. (9)
Observe that eﬃciency implies that we have a separating equilibrium.10
Denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the government’s budget con-
straint (7) and the incentive compatibility constraints (8)—(9) by μ,λh,a n dλl. Assume
that social welfare is concave such that in equilibrium the redistribution is from the rich
to the poor implying that the self-selection constraint (9) is non-binding (λl =0 ). One
10Clearly, T
h = T
l combined with g
h 6= g
l cannot be an equilibrium, for otherwise everyone wants the




l is not an equilibrium as everybody will then
want the bundle with the lower T. As to the bundles with T
h = T
l combined with g
h = g
l, they prevent
one to attain the redistributive beneﬁts (as there will be no redistribution). But they entail an eﬃciency
cost in that the rich and the poor will end up consuming diﬀerent amounts of c and the same amount
of g, so that they will have diﬀerent marginal rates of substitution between c and g. (Marginal rates of
substitution will be the same if preferences are quasi-linear. However, even in this case, redistribution is
beneﬁcial, unless the social welfare function is utilitarian, and that is lost under the pooling solution).























where a subscript under u(·) denotes its partial derivative with respect to the speciﬁed
argument. It follows from (10) that the consumption decision of the rich should not
be distorted in the second best. Moreover, if λh =0 , then ul
g/ul
x = p. Thus, when
the extent of redistribution towards the poor is “suﬃciently” limited, the consumption
decision of the poor is not distorted either. The second-best allocations then coincide
with the ﬁr s t - b e s t .T h i si ss h o w nb yl o c u sBG,w h e r ep o i n tB is the initial no policy
solution, in Figure 2.
As γl increases, the poor’s utility level increases along the ﬁrst-best utility frontier
attaining its highest value at the point where the incentive compatibility constraint of
the rich starts to bind (point G in Figure 2). As γl increases further, the redistribution
will no longer occur on the ﬁrst-best frontier. This portion of the second-best frontier
is depicted by the locus GM, where M is the point at which ul reaches its maximum
(corresponding to γl =1 ). Observe that the second-best utility frontier does not cross
the 45 degree line: The after-transfer utility of the poor can never exceed the after-tax
utility of the rich. We have:
u(Il − Tl,gl) <u (Ih − Tl,gl) ≤ u(Ih − Th,gh).
The ﬁrst inequality follows from Il <I h, and the second from (8).
Along GM, λh > 0. Moreover, with gl being less than optimal for the rich, uhl
g /uhl
x >
p. It then follows from equation (11) that ul
g/ul
x >p ,calling for a less than eﬃcient level
of gl in the second best. The intuition for a downward distortion in gl comes from its
impact on the rich’s incentive compatibility constraint. The lower the quantity of g that
is publicly provided, the less inclined the rich would be to covet the poor’s allocation.
To see this, note that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS)o fg for x is evaluated
13at (Il − Tl,gl) for the poor, and at (Ih − Tl,gl) for the rich pretending to be poor.
Consequently, MRShl >M R S l, and lowering gl would hurt the mimicker more than
the poor.11
4.1 No topping up and implementation
Some in-kind transfers may be supplemented, or “topped up,” via market purchases.
In the U.K. people can receive medical treatment on a private basis (in addition to the
services they are entitled to through the National Health Service). In other transfer
schemes, topping up is not allowed. If a consumer wants to have more of the good, or
ad i ﬀerent variety of it, he will have to “opt out” of the system: One can attend either
a public school, or a private school. Another example is the provision of housing of a
speciﬁed size, location, etc. Someone who wants a diﬀerent housing arrangement will
have to forego free public housing.12
As presented above, the second-best solution is attained when one leaves the pro-
vision of g completely in the hands of the government. This need not be the case,
however. Assume that g is a normal good but that it is provided subject to a no top-
ping up restriction: To consume more, one has to forego the ration and purchase all one
wants directly from the market (e.g., housing with certain square footage).13 Then a
policy of providing g for free to whoever wants it, while taxing those who participate in
11Observe, however, that a downward distortion exists relative to the poor’s demand upon receiving
the income transfer. That is, the poor would wish to purchase more of g if they were to receive the
income equivalent of their net transfers in cash. The poor’s consumption of g when it is provided
publicly may very well exceed the level they would themselves purchase in the absence of any transfers.
12The inability to top up may be a technical phenomenon or caused by institutional constraints. Goods
which have to be consumed in whole or not at all (schooling, housing of a particular characteristic) can
be improved, but, technically, they cannot be topped up. On the other hand, setting an upper limit to
the square footage of publicly provided housing or the coverage of a health plan is institutional. In the
former type cases, public provision programs attempt to exploit the infeasibility of topping up. In the
latter, the decision to allow topping up is endogenous and has to be determined as part of the provider’s
optimization problem. See Blomquist and Christiansen (1998).
13In Besley and Coate (1991), and Gahvari and Mattos (2007), the publicly-provided good is an
indivisible one, consumed either in whole or not at all. It may be packaged in diﬀerent variants, each
e m b o d y i n gad i ﬀerent level of quality g. The consumer can buy only one variant; diﬀerent variants
cannot be combined. This can be thought of as an education packaged either as public versus private
schools (where extra tutorial classes will not be construed as a substitute for one or the other type of
schools).
14the program diﬀerently from those who do not, implements the second-best allocations.
The government provides g at a level equal to g = gl, taxes the participants in the
program by Tl and the non-participants by Th − pgh where the values of gl,gh,Tl and
Th are those determined in problem (7)—(9). Under this arrangement, and given that
the second-best solution is a separating equilibrium, only the poor participates in the
program. The h-types will spend pgh in order to consume gh, rather than getting it
from the government for free. However, they will be taxed pgh dollars less so that their
net income remains the same. Moreover, given that gh satisﬁes equation (10), they will
purchase precisely gh when faced with price p.
Formally, let x(p,Ij) and g(p,Ij) denote the j-type’s demand functions for x and
g, if she were to purchase them from the market. These correspond to type j ’s





. To get the poor to choose the public ration, and the
rich to buy g from the market, the following incentive compatibility constraints must
be satisﬁed:
v(p,Ih − Th) ≥ u(Ih − Tl,g), (12)
u(Il − Tl,g) ≥ v(p,Il − Th). (13)
Moreover, as long as only the poor participate in the public provision scheme, the
government’s budget constraint is given by
πhTh + πlTl = πlpg. (14)
One can easily check that this problem yields the second-best allocations.
The Pareto-superiority of the public provision scheme comes from the fact that
the second-best solution cannot in general be decentralized through a pure tax/transfer
policy. Decentralization requires public observability of personal purchases of g (i.e. who
buys how much)–a type of information which the tax authority does not generally have.
If it did, one would not need to rely on in-kind transfers to implement the second-best
solution derived from problem (12)—(14). A combination of diﬀerential consumption
15taxes and diﬀerential income taxes would suﬃce. Speciﬁcally, this is achieved by Th,Tl
[set at the same values as in problem (12)—(14)], in combination with a tax on gl equal
to ul
g/ul
x − p as given by (11), and with no tax on gh.14
4.1.1 Price subsidies and third best
It is often the case, however, that gh and gl are not observable at a personal level. One
can then tax gh and gl only uniformly and the solution will end up to be a universal
cash transfer program and third best. To see this, observe that with both types facing
the same commodity tax rate τ, the incentive compatibility constraints are
v(p + τ,Ih − Th) ≥ v(p + τ,Ih − Tl),
v(p + τ,Il − Tl) ≥ v(p + τ,Il − Th),
which imply that Th = Tl–a universal cash transfer program. Observe also that this
problem is the second-best problem with the added restrictions that Th = Tl, and
MRSh = MRSl. Consequently, its solution will be third best.
4.2 Link with the literature
The second-best solution described above is identical to Gahvari and Mattos’s (2007)
solution presented in terms of “conditional cash transfers” where the recipients of in-
kind transfers also receive a certain amount of cash from the government. Thus the poor
receive not just a good with quality level g, but g plus the conditional cash transfer t,
and everybody pays the same lump-sum tax, T.
In Besley and Coate (1991), individuals are oﬀered g, but everybody is taxed at the
same rate T. Once again there will be a self-targeting solution, albeit a less eﬃcient
one. To derive Besley and Coate’s solution, simply impose the restrictions Tl = T,
Th = T +pgh on problem (12)—(14) above. Alternatively, the “bundles” could be (T,gl)
for the poor and T for the rich (who will then be allowed to purchase g freely from
14The consumption of x is from one’s endowment and not taxable. Otherwise, one could impose
uniform tax rates on consumption of all goods and rebate the proceeds equally to the poor and rich.
This would yield a ﬁrst-best outcome.
16the market). The feasible utility distributions under this latter scheme constitute the
third-best allocations and are depicted by DB0EF in Figure 2. Point D corresponds
to the minimum value of g which satisﬁes the poor’s incentive compatibility constraint
(13) assuming that Tl = T and Th = T + pgh. Observe, however, that at this point
the poor are worse oﬀ than in the absence of the transfer policy. In order for the poor
to be at least as happy as they would be without the government transfer policy, one
must have u(Il − T,g) ≥ v(p,Il). When this is satisﬁed as an equality, the distribution
of utilities is given by B0. Finally, point F corresponds to the distribution of utilities
when g attains its maximum level such that the incentive compatibility constraint for
the rich (12) is satisﬁed (with Tl = T and Th = T + pgh).
Observe that the third-best frontier DB0EF will have at most one point in common
with the ﬁrst-best frontier (which will then also be a common point with the second-best
frontier). This point is denoted by E in Figure 2. The level of g at this point is found
from g∗ = g
¡
p,Il + πhpg∗¢
.15 The two frontiers will necessarily have a common point
if g∗ is smaller than the maximum value of g that satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint for the rich (12). This is the case depicted in Figure 2.16 Moreover, given that
the rich do not participate in the transfer program and purchase their most-preferred
bundle from the market, g∗ must be ﬁrst best.
In Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), the unobservability of preferences take the cen-
ter stage. Nevertheless the informational issues and the corresponding ﬁrst-, second-,
15The poor receive pg in kind and pay T = π
lpg in taxes; the monetary value of the net transfer to
ap o o ri n d i v i d u a li st h u spg − π
lpg = π
hpg. At g = g
∗, the poor are indiﬀerent between receiving one
extra dollar in cash and one extra dollar worth of the publicly-provided good. At this point, ug/ux = p.
Moreover, if g<g
∗,u g/ux >pand g is less than eﬃcient; while if g>g
∗,u g/ux <pand g is more
than eﬃcient.
16On the other hand, it is possible for g
∗ to be larger than the maximum feasible value of g. Under
this circumstance, DB
0EF will not touch the ﬁrst-best frontier and attains its highest u
l level at its
intersection with GM; see Figure 2 in Gahvari and Mattos (2007). Observe also that while g
∗ is eﬃcient
from the perspective of the poor, it does not result in the maximal utility for them. The point is that
g
∗ would maximize their utility (they would choose it voluntarily) provided that t h es i z eo ft h e i rn e t
t r a n s f e ri sc o n s t a n t .T h i si sn o tt h ec a s eh e r e .T h ep o o rr e c e i v ean e tt r a n s f e ro fπ
hpg which directly
increases with g.I ne ﬀect, a one unit increase in g will cost the poor p−π
hp = π
lp instead of p (which
would be the case if net transfers were constant). It should not then be surprising to ﬁnd that the poor’s
utility would increase if g exceeds g
∗.
17and third-best solutions have the same properties as discussed above. One exception is
that their second-best solutions–those that are not also ﬁrst best–appear to be the op-
posite of the ones we derived here. Blackorby and Donaldson’s second-best solutions are
characterized by over-provision of in-kind transfers, as opposed to the under-provision
result we derived above. This is, in fact, not surprising and rather intuitive; both results
arise from the same principle that underlies our result. In Blackorby and Donaldson,
one type (Able) derives utility only from consumption goods and the other (Inﬁrm)
from consumption goods and the publicly-provided good. Their second-best solutions
are characterized by redistribution from Able to Inﬁrm, with Inﬁrm preferring more
of the publicly-provided good (the Able consumes none). Because MRSAI <M R S I,
where A stands for Able and I for inﬁrm, an upward distortion makes it less desirable
for Able to mimic the Inﬁrm. In our setting, redistribution was from the rich (h)t o
poor (l); and because MRShl >M R S l, a downward distortion made it less desirable
for h to mimic l.
Other considerations come to play also when the government provides more than
one publicly-provided good. In many developing countries, for example, the poor are
represented more heavily in elementary schools than in high schools and universities.
Consequently, to enhance target eﬃciency, the government should spend more resources
on basic education rather than on higher education.
5 T a r g e t i n ga n dt a k eu pi np r a c t i c e
It is diﬃcult to come up with examples of large-scale transfer programs that are purely
self-targeted. Rather than being required to consume the in-kind transfer in order to
get cash, cash transfers in the U.S. are often automatically eligible for a range of in-kind
beneﬁts: Welfare recipients are also entitled to Food Stamps, Medicaid, and priority for
housing assistance. This way of organizing programs implies that the authorities ﬁrst
observe and verify income, and then give beneﬁts in kind, which would seem to rule out
self-targeting as the primary reason for supplying beneﬁts in-kind, at least among the
welfare population. Moreover, although there may be elements of the program that
18are designed to get recipients to self-select in or out of the program, the authorities
still generally expend considerable resources determining eligibility, and most recipients
are required to document their eligibility at regular intervals (which is in many cases a
major barrier to takeup).
Many developing countries have adopted conditional cash transfer programs in recent
years. These may seem like the programs described above. However, in most of these
programs, the authorities ﬁrst determine who would be eligible for the program, and
then oﬀer beneﬁts, so that take-up of the in-kind program does not assist targeting.
Two prominent examples of this genre are Bolsa-Escola in Brazil and the Progresa
program in Mexico. Under Bolsa-Escola, families received a monthly stipend for each
child enrolled in public schools (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003). Mexico’s
Progresa distributes nutritional supplements in addition to cash and is conditioned
on school attendance as well as regular health checkups. Similar programs exist in
Bangladesh, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua (see Rawlings and Rubio,
2005 for a survey). New York City has recently announced an experimental conditional
cash transfer program modeled on Progresa. Poor families will receive a “passport”
detailing the amounts they will receive for compliance with various program goals such
as keeping their children in school, and taking them for checkups (Cardwell, 2007). It
is possible that the nutritional supplements oﬀered under Progresa are a suﬃciently
inferior good that they help to identify the neediest people (but that is an empirical
question). It seems more likely that such programs are justiﬁed by paternalism (after
all, they prescribe the behavior that must be followed for people to receive beneﬁts), by
the Samaritan’s dilemma discussed in Section 10 below, or by politics in countries in
which the rich do not wish to give cash transfers to the poor.
Another diﬃculty is that one would generally need to know who the intended recipi-
ents and non-recipients are to know whether a particular program has been successfully
self-targeted. For example, Sweden has universally available public child care for young
children, which is widely used. Some parents still prefer, however, to hire nannies for
child care. Should we say that because a very small number of people opt out of the
19public program, that it is successfully self-targeted?
Self-targeting is sometimes presented as an explanation for program rules that are
burdensome to applicants–for example, application procedures may require many trips
to the welfare oﬃce, intrusive unnecessary questions (for example, in some U.S. states
Food Stamp applicants are asked to document whether they own burial plots even
though the value of a burial plot cannot be counted as an asset in the determination of
eligibility.) It is diﬃcult to prove that rules that make applying for welfare programs
diﬃcult improve targeting. Instead, targeting rules often tend to exclude the neediest
potential recipients, because they are the ones who have the most diﬃculty complying
with program rules.
Table 4, which is adapted from Alderman (2002), describes food programs available
in a number of developing countries, some of which are self-targeted. The table suggests
that both self-targeted programs, and programs that are targeted in other way are
generally successful in avoiding “leakages” of food to unintended recipients. However,
the success of the self-targeting programs comes at a cost. Jacoby (1997) discusses a
Jamaican program that provided a free bland lunch supplement. Fewer than 60 percent
of children participated in the program, and lower income people were much more
likely to participate than higher income ones. However, using an estimate of equivalent
variation, he concludes that while it cost $400 per year to provide the supplement,
households valued it at about $158 per year. Therefore, even though the program
seemed to be successfully targeting the neediest children by oﬀering a good of low
quality, there was a large deadweight loss associated with the fact that the good was
unattractive. The general lesson here appears to be that successful targeting is not a
suﬃcient condition for the program to be economical or eﬃcient.
The best examples of self-targeted programs may be training programs for the un-
employed. Programs like the “New Deal for the Unemployed” in the U.K. tie receipt of
cash beneﬁts to participation in in-kind programs. The New Deal made participation
in job training programs compulsory for many groups of unemployed.17
17Education and health services are not the only examples of “low quality” goods that developing
205.1 Take up problems
If authorities wish to target programs (rather than have universal programs), and self-
targeting is not possible, certain problems will surface with respect to program take up.
If it is easy to get on the program, too many of the non-targeted people may take up
beneﬁts, and if it is hard to prove eligibility for the program, many eligibles may be
erroneously screened out. Currie (2006a) surveys the literature regarding take up of
programs in the U.S. and the U.K. and ﬁnds that take up rates vary widely even for
programs oﬀering similar beneﬁts. For example, take up of U.S. public health insurance
programs for child birth has been quite high (35 to 40 percent of all U.S. births are now
paid for by the Medicaid program), while many eligible pregnant women fail to take up
prenatal care beneﬁts (Ellwood and Kenney, 1995). And take up among newly eligible
children is thought to be quite low (8 to 14%).
Since income and age cutoﬀs for these programs were raised at diﬀerent rates and
diﬀerent states, there is a great deal of variation in the rules that can be used to
identify the eﬀects of making children eligible for public health insurance. Papers that
examine take up typically ﬁrst compute whether or not a child of a given age in a
given state and year was eligible for Medicaid, and then regress coverage on eligibility.
One problem with this procedure is that families can take steps to make themselves
eligible by reducing their incomes. Currie and Gruber (1996) deal with this problem
by instrumenting individual eligibility with the fraction of a ﬁxed national group of
children who would be eligible under the state’s laws. This instrument can be thought
of as a summary statistic for the generosity of the state’s law, which does not depend
on individual income. Another approach which can be applied in panel data is to
estimate eligibility using income from a “base period” (see Gruber and Simon, 2007).
countries provide publicly for the beneﬁt of their poor. Low quality foodstuﬀ is another example. The
government of Tunisia subsidizes the provision of such goods in a way that only the poor households will
want to consume them. Another variant of these schemes links public provision of one good to another
(rather than linking cash to goods). In Bangladesh and Philippines, for example, school children receive
free food if they attend school. Mexico’s Progresa also provides nutritional supplements to people who
visit health centers. In these schemes, food works as a substitute for cash inducing the recipients to go
to school and/or to have health checkups (who otherwise may not want to do so).
21The reason that delivery is so much more likely to be covered than prenatal care or care
of older children is that hospitals have an incentive to assist eligible mothers who are
delivering to enroll. Otherwise, the hospital is required to provide emergency care to
w o m e ni nl a b o r ,r e g a r d l e s so ft he woman’s insurance status.
High take up of Medicare forms an interesting contrast to low take up of Medicaid
among the non-elderly. There is almost 100 percent take up of the optional Medicare
“Part B” program which covers outpatient services. The reason this is surprising is
that people must pay premiums for Part B Insurance, even though these premiums are
highly subsidized. A key diﬀerence between the two programs is that when people turn
65 years old, they have to ﬁle a form in order to decline Part B coverage, whereas people
have to go through a complicated process in order to get Medicaid coverage. Thus, it
seems to be the diﬀerence in the costs of applying that lead to the diﬀerences in take
up rates. Currie (2006b) suggests a possible solution to the problem of reaching the
neediest with targeted programs. One could oﬀer a universal programs with sliding fees
payable through the tax system, and also oﬀer individuals the freedom to opt out of the
universal program through either an administrative procedure, or payment of higher
fees. One could argue that the current system of public schooling operates this way in
many countries.
There is a great deal of evidence that potential recipients of in-kind transfers are
sensitive to application costs. Currie (2000) ﬁnds that the Medicaid enrollment of im-
migrant children increases with family size, suggesting that it is beneﬁts relative to
enrollment costs that matter. Blank and Ruggles’ (1996) study of participation in cash
welfare (the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program) and food stamps (the
U.S. Food Stamp Program, or FSP) showed that participation increased with the size
of the beneﬁts people were eligible for, which would not be the case if enrollment was
costless (or if there were no stigma). Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) conducted
a randomized experiment, and found that informing people about their eligibility for
the FSP increased the probability of participation. However, people eligible for larger
beneﬁts were more likely to take them up, once again suggesting a non-trivial role for
22transactions costs/stigma. Currie and Grogger (2002) focus directly on transactions
costs, and show that reducing recertiﬁcation intervals had a negative eﬀect on partici-
pation in the Food Stamp Program, particularly among single heads and people in rural
areas, both groups that might be expected to have relatively high transactions costs.
Yelowitz (1996) provides evidence that altering enrollment requirements for one
program can have spillover eﬀects onto the enrollments in other programs. He estimates
that for every 10 newly eligible families who took up Medicaid beneﬁts, four also took
up the Food Stamp Program. A likely explanation is that both programs were handled
b yt h es a m ew e l f a r eo ﬃces, so that it is more worthwhile to bear the application costs
when applying for Medicaid and the FSP together than for FSP alone. Conversely,
reductions in the U.S. welfare caseload have impacted enrollments in other programs.
Zedlewski and Brauner (1999) and Currie and Grogger (2001) ﬁnd that reductions in
cash welfare reduced enrollment in the Food Stamps Program. Since most people who
left welfare remained eligible for the FSP, the main reason they left the rolls is likely
to be because they were no longer automatically eligible for FSP when they lost cash
welfare.
Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (1998) have a particularly striking result. They
ﬁnd that in Michigan, 2/3 of the people applying for Social Security Insurance (SSI,
a social insurance program for the disabled) in 1990 and 1991 had just been kicked
oﬀ of General Assistance (a program for the indigent). The beneﬁts available under
SSI were always much higher than those available under General Assistance, but it is
more diﬃcult to qualify for SSI. Apparently, many people who were eligible for both
programs registered only for General Assistance when that was an option because they
were unwilling to bear the cost of applying for SSI.
5.2 Do non-ﬁnancial barriers screen out the right people?
These observations about the importance of enrollment costs and other non-ﬁnancial
barriers to participation raise the question of whether the non-ﬁnancial barriers screen
out the “right” people? That is, are the various administrative requirements attached
23to these transfer programs targeting beneﬁts to the neediest eligibles?
In many cases, attempts to answer these questions are hampered by the fact that
we do not have a precise measure of who is eligible. For example, in the case of SSI, we
need to know not only that someone is low income, but also that they are “disabled”, a
concept that is socially determined. Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003) look at
“classiﬁcation errors” in disability insurance programs under the assumptions that a)
the individual’s report to the Health and Retirement Survey about their disability status
is the truth, and b) that both the government’s assessment of the individual’s disability
status and the self-report are noisy but unbiased measures of true disability. Under
either assumption, they ﬁnd that 28% of the applicants who are ultimately awarded
beneﬁts are not disabled (by their own survey reports), while 61% of the applicants
whose applications are denied are actually disabled.
Similarly, Reeder (1985) ﬁnds that the poorest households are less likely than slightly
better oﬀ households to live in public housing in the U.S., perhaps because the most
vulnerable households have diﬃculty getting through the application process. On the
other hand, some programs do seem to serve the neediest applicants. For example, Head
Start, which is required to serve the neediest children ﬁrst, seems to fulﬁll this mandate.
This may be because Head Start programs are required to set out speciﬁc criteria for
identifying and enrolling needy children.
Households may be receiving aid when they do not appear to be eligible, but it is
important not to assume that all of these households are in violation of program rules.
Recertiﬁcation intervals provide a potential reason for households with incomes above
thresholds to be on public assistance. We know, for example, that households tend to
seek public assistance when their income is unusually low (c.f. Ashenfelter, 1983). In this
case, we might expect household income to rise mechanically after program enrollment.
Since families tend to be certiﬁed for beneﬁts for a ﬁxed period, such a pattern might
lead us to observe many families in a cross section who participated in a public program
even though their incomes were somewhat above the eligibility threshold.
The question of whether beneﬁts have been correctly targeted to those in need has
24recently been exhaustively studied in the case of the Medicaid program. Many authors
have attempted to judge the extent to which expansions of the Medicaid program to
additional groups of pregnant women and children led to increases in the take up of
public insurance by the target group—people who would otherwise have been uninsured.
These authors have also attempted to gauge the extent to which the Medicaid expansions
led people who would otherwise have had priv a t ei n s u r a n c et ot a k eu pM e d i c a i d .T h e
latter phenomena has been dubbed “crowd out”.
The Medicaid expansions led to dramatic increases in the fraction of children eligible
for public health insurance (Currie and Gruber, 1996a,b). But it led to much smaller
increases in the fraction of children covered by any health insurance because of declines
in the fraction of children covered by private health insurance. However, private health
insurance coverage has also been falling among groups that one would not expect to be
aﬀected by the Medicaid expansions, such as single men. Thus, it is not obvious to what
extent the relationship between increases in public insurance and decreases in private
insurance is causal, though it seems clear that a signiﬁcant amount of crowd out has
occurred (see the discussion in Gruber and Simon, 2007).
There is also a large literature about crowd out in the context of public housing
programs (see Olsen, 2003). The typical questions are whether government construction
crowds out private construction, and whether housing subsidies aﬀect private rents. For
example, Sinai and Waldfogel (2002) conclude that two units of privately constructed
housing are crowded out for every three units of government housing that are provided
and that subsidies may be more eﬀective than government construction.
5.3 Is low take up an American problem?
Low take up of social programs is often perceived as a peculiarly American problem,
because of the U.S.’s heavy reliance on means-tested programs in its social security
system. Craig (1991) provides a survey of take up in the U.K., which is updated in
Currie (1996a). They conclude that many U.K. programs also exhibit less than full
take up. Estimates of take up of the Working Families’ Tax Credit (which is similar to
25the American Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC) by single mothers range from 67 to
81%, which is comparable to Scholz’ estimates of 80 to 87% for the EITC. Take up of
Income Support among non-pensioners, which (at least for lone mothers) corresponds
roughly to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, seems to be higher in the U.K.
than in the U.S., though at 80%, is still much less than full. Take up of Income Support
for pensioners (which corresponds to SSI for the elderly) is somewhat higher than in
the U.S. at between 64 and 78%, but again, is much less than 100%.
These rough comparisons suggest that perhaps more attention should be paid to
factors determining take up of social beneﬁts outside the U.S. It is interesting to note
that the one U.K. program with near universal take up is the Child Beneﬁt. Mothers
receive the application materials for this program in hospital, which presumably greatly
reduces application transactions costs.
The discussion of social beneﬁts in the U.K. might also lead us to think beyond
the question of “who takes up programs?” to “do recipients make optimal use of pro-
grams that they have taken up and if not, why not?” Research on the National Health
Insurance program suggests that although there is universal take up, the rich receive
more services than the poor, conditional on their health status. Possible reasons range
from higher transactions costs (e.g. lack of transportation, or inability to take time oﬀ
from work); superior connections and communication skills and/or better rapport with
medical providers; and diﬀerences in attitudes towards illness and medical care (Dixon
et al, 2003). It is possible that the same factors that inhibit take up may also aﬀect
utilization of social programs.
5.4 Other perspectives on take up
A newer focus of the take up literature concerns the extent to which networks play a
role in decisions about take up. Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) show that
a woman’s propensity to use welfare increases with the number of coethnics in the area,
if those coethnics are from a group that has a high propensity to use welfare nationally.
However, as Manski (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Moﬃtt (2001) and others have
26highlighted, these correlations could reﬂect several diﬀerent things: an endogenous eﬀect
in which the propensity of an individual to behave in a particular way was causally
inﬂuenced by the behavior of other members of the group; an exogenous eﬀect in which
the individual’s behavior is inﬂuenced by an exogenous characteristic that deﬁnes group
membership; or a correlated eﬀect in which individuals from the same group tend to
b e h a v et h es a m ew a yb e c a u s et h e yh a v es i m i l a rindividual characteristics or face similar
constraints. Using data on utilization of publicly sponsored prenatal care, Aizer and
Currie (2005) show that when they estimate a model similar to that of Bertrand et al.
they also ﬁnd a large “network” eﬀect in the utilization of public prenatal care services.
But when they control for the hospital of delivery, these eﬀects disappear. This ﬁnding
suggests that what looks like an interactive network eﬀect may actually be the result of
external constraints that dictate which hospital a woman living in a given area chooses.
That is, some hospitals may simply be more welcoming to women from diﬀerent groups.
Finally, the importance of transactions costs suggests some scope for the application
of behavioral economics. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) argue that people tend to put
more weight on the present than on the future when making decisions. Their model
allows for this feature by adopting hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting. The
model has an obvious application here, in that many of the costs of enrolling in social
programs are borne immediately, whereas the beneﬁts are in the future. Hence, a person
with time-inconsistent preferences might put oﬀ enrolling in the program, even though
he would ﬁnd it utility maximizing to have enrolled as a participant at a later date.
This might be particularly true of programs such as public health insurance, where the
beneﬁts might not even be needed unless a future health shock occurs.
6I m p r o v i n g t a x e ﬃciency through labor supply: I
A basic tenet of the optimal tax literature à la Mirrlees is that the tax authorities do
not typically have information on taxpayers’ types, but that the taxpayers’ incomes
are publicly observable. Section 4’s assumption of income exogeneity prevents one
from investigating the implications of this informational structure for the question of
27cash versus in-kind transfers. That assumption identiﬁes types–earning abilities–with
incomes, so that observability of types and incomes become one and the same. In order
to examine the implications of these two very diﬀerent informational structures, we drop
the income exogeneity assumption in this section.
If types were publicly observable, all ﬁrst-best optima would be attainable through
diﬀerential lump-sum taxes and there would be no role for in-kind transfers. The unob-
servability of types rules out diﬀerential lump-sum taxes just as Section 4 did. But the
observability of incomes now implies that we have a tax instrument which we did not
have before; namely, the diﬀerential taxation of incomes. At ﬁrst, one may think that
this new tax instrument makes in-kind transfers redundant. But this will not be the
case. The crucial point is that, given an income tax, the economy is in a second-best
environment. And we know from Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) that in such environ-
ments “forced consumption” or “rationing” can be Pareto improving. The role of in-kind
transfers in a second-best setting is to alleviate the existing excess burden of the tax
system while achieving the same amount of redistribution.
In the presence of an income tax, public provision can potentially stimulate labor
supply, something that cash transfers cannot do. This should not be surprising in light of
the depressing, and distorting, eﬀect of income taxation on labor supply. To the extent
that this is possible, increases in labor supply will enhance the government’s aggregate
income tax revenues, enabling the government to undertake more expenditures and to
raise everybody’s welfare. The degree of complementarity between labor supply and
publicly-provided goods becomes the crucial determining factor here.
The basic insight for this result is most easily grasped by assuming that the income
tax structure is linear. We shall study this case below, and then turn to the more general
framework of nonlinear income taxation in the following section.
286.1 Linear income taxes
A s s u m et h ei n c o m et a xs t r u c t u r ei sl i n e a ra nd that it is set optimally (to maximize a
concave social welfare function).18 Denote the lump-sum element of the linear income
tax by s, a n dt h et a xr a t eb yθ. There are again two types of individuals: one with low
earnings ability, or wages, and the other with high earnings ability. Denoting the former
with l and the latter with h,w eh a v ewl <w h. For each j-type person let wj denote
the wage and gj the demand for the good subject to in-kind transfers in the absence of






Suppose we give each person gj and ﬁnance it by reducing that person’s cash transfers,
s, by the amount pgj. It is plain that this switch leaves the initial solution unchanged.
Consider now what happens to the j-type’s welfare if we increase the allotment of g
from gj by a very small amount ε while reducing the transfer s by pε .Guesnerie and
Roberts (1984) provide a general framework to address this question. The direct eﬀect of
this change on the utility of the j-type is zero because, ex hypothesis, the level at which
the change is evaluated is optimal. Thus the only welfare eﬀect which need concern us
is what happens to tax revenues. Gahvari (1994) proves that this eﬀect is positive as
long as g and labor supply are Hicks complements.19
The theory of the second-best provides another intuition for this result. Income
taxation leads to a lower than optimal supply of labor through its substitution eﬀect.
When in-kind transfers and labor supply are Hicks complements, pushing in-kind trans-
fers above the level that the recipients would buy for themselves, if given the value of the
transfers in cash, enhances labor supply and oﬀsets the existing labor supply distortion.
Hence, despite the distortion that public provision creates–by “forcing” the recipients
18Although the income tax rate is the same for both types, income tax revenues collected will not be.
19Observe that in this framework, there always exists one good whose provision by the public sector
will be Pareto improving. This follows because leisure must have at least one Hicks substitute (labor
supply must have a Hicks complement). See also Murray (1980) and Leonesio (1988) on the relationship
between public provision and labor supply, and Neary and Roberts (1980) for a general discussion of
demand under rationing.
29to consume a diﬀerent amount than they would have consumed voluntarily–it can, on
balance, be Pareto improving.
Munro (1992) and Gahvari (1995) discuss how a Pareto-improving in-kind transfer
policy can be organized in this framework. Munro’s approach is based on the idea of
self-targeting discussed in Section 4 where topping up is not feasible. Assume g is a
normal good. Set the level of in-kind transfers the recipients would receive at gl+ε, and
charge recipients less than p(gl + ε), with the diﬀerence being covered by the increase
in government tax revenues that will follow (as argued above). The non-participants
continue to face the same linear income tax schedule as before. Under this scheme,
low-ability persons will be better oﬀ participating. High-ability persons, on the other
hand, will not participate as they continue to prefer their allocation under the linear
income tax. This follows because initially, with only the linear income tax in place, they
preferred their own allocation strictly to that of the low-ability individuals.
Gahvari (1995) considers a universal program and allows for topping up. The public
provision is again set at gl+ε. Now everybody participates, with the high-ability persons
topping up their consumption.20 Observe that because the extra tax revenues generated
by the higher labor supply of the poor is now used to ﬁnance the transfers received by
everyone, this policy will be less redistributive than the self-targeting one. To oﬀset this,
one may think of boosting the labor supply of the rich as well, in order to increase the
tax revenues they generate. Such a scheme requires the government to oﬀer diﬀerent
amounts of g to the two types (gl + ε to the poor and gh + ε to the rich). This is
inconsistent with the simple framework of a linear income tax; however. We return to
this issue in the next section where we allow the government to levy a general income
tax.
Note that instead of public provision, one can rely on price subsidies to stimulate
labor supply. Indeed, subsidizing g relative to x encourages everybody’s consumption of
20If g is set just above the demand of the high-ability individuals, the poor will have to consume more
g than before which reduces their utility. Whether or not such a policy is welfare improving depends
on how this negative direct utility eﬀect balances out the positive welfare eﬀects of spending the extra
tax revenues.
30g, a n dw i t hi t ,everybody’s labor supply (assuming g and labor supply are complements,
of course). This is the positive aspect of price subsidies. Moreover, the fact that the rich
also receive subsidies does not necessarily mean that the tax system is less redistributive.
The government can adjust the linear income tax structure to ensure that redistribution
is not diminished. All of this follows, of course, from the optimal tax literature. In the
presence of an income tax, diﬀerential commodity taxes are useful unless preferences
are weakly separable in labor supply and other goods, with the subutility of the other
goods being homothetic; see Deaton (1979).21
7I m p r o v i n g t a x e ﬃciency through labor supply: II
When individuals’ incomes are publicly observable, there is no informational reason to
restrict the income tax structure to be linear; the government is able to levy a nonlinear
income tax schedule. It is then natural to ask if there continues to be a role for in-kind
transfers in the presence of this more versatile income tax instrument. The past decade
has seen the development of a literature around this very question. As with the linear
income tax case, the literature considers two types of policies. One follows Munro (1992)
and considers in-kind transfers with no topping up possibility designed for take up by
the poor only; see Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1998b). The other, Blomquist
and Christiansen (1998a, 1998b), Boadway and Marchand (1995), Cremer and Gahvari
(1997), and Boadway et al. (1998), follow Gahvari (1995) and discuss a universal public
provision scheme.22 The main message of this literature remains the same as with the
linear income tax systems. In-kind transfers enhance the eﬃciency of the tax system,
or its redistributive eﬀectiveness, via their stimulating eﬀect on labor supply.
21Deaton and Stern (1986) have generalized this result by allowing Engel curves to have diﬀerent
intercepts while the government is able to make diﬀerential lump-sum grants conditioned on observable
household characteristics.
22Boadway and Marchand (1995) and Cremer and Gahvari (1997) examine the usefulness of public
provision in a model with a general income tax. Cremer and Gahvari, in contrast to Boadway and
Marchand, also allow for commodity taxes and price subsidies. Blomquist and Christiansen (1998a)
compare price subsidies alone with public provision alone, and Boadway et al. (1998) discuss under what
conditions publicly-provided goods should be subsidized when purchased in the market. Blomquist and
Christiansen (1998b) compare welfare properties of in-kind transfers with and without topping up.
31In-kind transfers that disallow topping up are self-targeted whether or not incomes
are endogenous. As such, they supplement tax instruments for the purpose of separating
the more able and the less able individuals, as in the self-targeting literature we reviewed
in Section 4. To be sure, that literature, by ignoring the distinction between ability and
income, severely limited the role of tax instruments and used in-kind transfers more as
a substitute for the income tax system. Nevertheless, as we demonstrate below, in-kind
transfers enhance the separating property of even a well-designed nonlinear income tax
system. And they can do this most eﬀectively when in-kind programs are complements
to labor supply.
Universal provision programs are not self-targeted in that both the poor and the
rich participate in them. Nevertheless, they increase the redistributive power of the
income tax system (for the same excess burden). Thus, the additional redistribution
is “targeted” towards the low-ability persons. And, unless there are other reasons for
providing aid in a particular form, what is important is the extent of redistribution
itself. Their eﬀectiveness, as we show below, rests also on their being complements to
labor supply.
The mechanism through which public provision achieves more redistribution is the
same for targeted and universal programs. To see this, recall that in the two-group
version of Mirrlees’ (1971) model, which is one of pure taxation, redistribution from the
high- to low-ability types is maximal when the high-ability type (rich) is just about to
mimic the low-ability type (poor). For in-kind transfers to be welfare improving, they
have to enable the government to undertake more redistribution than was possible under
Mirrlees’ solution (for the same excess burden). This can be done if public provision
hurts the mimicker without hurting the poor (or hurts the mimicker more than the
poor). If doable, the scheme reduces the rich types’ informational rent–a surplus that
can be transferred to the poor.
Now one can always hurt the mimicker more than the poor via a self-targeted pro-
gram as long as the mimicker and the poor want to consume diﬀerent levels of the good
subject to transfers, g, at Mirrlees’ optimum. However, given that the mimicker and the
32poor diﬀer only in their labor supplies, the extent to which their desired consumption
levels diﬀer depends crucially on the degree of complementarity between labor supply
and g. The higher the degree of complementarity, the greater the diﬀerence between
the desired consumption levels, and the more eﬀectual public provision will be.
The potential redistribution of a universal program is less obvious. To eﬀect more
redistribution, one has to impose a minimum consumption level of g on the recipients.
Achieving more redistribution then requires this minimum consumption level to be less
pressing for the poor than for the rich pretending to be poor (to “force” the mimicker,
but not the poor, to consume more g than desired). This can be done if the mimicker’s
demand for g is lower than that of the poor person’s at the Mirrlees’ optimum. Then,
one can set g at a level above the mimicker’s, but lower than the poor person’s, demand.
Now, to identify what goods can usefully be provided on a universal basis, recall that,
at the Mirrlees’ optimum, the mimicker has a lower labor supply than the poor (he has
a higher wage but the same income). One then asks: Under what circumstances would
the mimicker have a lower demand for g than the poor, given that the mimicker has a
lower labor supply? The answer is when g and labor supply are complements.
Before studying these questions in more detail, we note an existing result from
the optimal income tax literature that pinpoints a circumstance under which in-kind
transfers, targeted or universal, are redundant.
7.1 Weakly separable preferences in labor
Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) celebrated result teaches us that if preferences are weakly
separable between labor supply and consumption goods, and identical for all consumer
types, Pareto eﬃcient allocations–constrained by self-selection–can be implemented
through a general income tax alone. That is, commodity taxes are not needed. An
implication of this is that public provision will also be unnecessary.23
23A version of this proposition is demonstrated in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). In their speci-
ﬁcation, publicly-provided goods are not modeled explictly. Preferences depend only on labor supply
and post-tax income, with the beneﬁts from in-kind transfers being subsumed in post-tax income in
terms of their market values. As a result, labor supply has essentially the same complementarity or
substitutability relationship with all goods, privately- or publicly-provided.
33Observe, however, that the available econometric studies do not support the labor
separability assumption; see, e.g., Browning and Meghir (1991). Thus, in practice,
one can not reject the usefulness of in-kind transfers on the basis of Atkinson and
Stiglitz’s result even if the tax policy is optimally designed. Observe also that what is
crucial for the Atkinson and Stiglitz result to hold, i.e. for consumption taxes to be
redundant, is that the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods is the same
for the mimicker and the mimicked. When the only source of heterogeneity is skills, the
equality of the marginal rates of substitution will be guaranteed by weak-separability
of preferences. If there is more than one source of heterogeneity, as in Cremer and
Gahvari (1995, 1998, 2002), Cremer et al. (2001), and Saez (2002), weak separability
of preferences in labor supply is no longer suﬃcient for this result. The implication for
in-kind transfers is that they may remain useful even in the face of weak-separability of
preferences.
7.2 Non-separable preferences
Observe ﬁrst that while we allow for income taxes to be nonlinear, we do not do this
for commodity taxes. This is the most commonly adopted assumption in the optimal
tax literature, based on what is regarded to be the most reasonable informational struc-
ture in the economy. The rationale for it is that public observability of individuals’
incomes, which allows incomes to be taxed nonlinearly, is quite a bit less demanding
informationally than the observability of personal consumption levels required for non-
linear taxation of goods. Tax administrations typically have no information on personal
consumption levels, at least not for all commodities. What one may reasonably assume
to be available to them, is information on anonymous transactions (rather than on who
purchases how much). Under this circumstance, non-linear commodity taxation is not
feasible; only linear commodity taxes are available.24
Let preferences be represented by u(x,g,1−L) where x and g are deﬁned as above,
L denotes labor supply, and the time endowment is normalized to one. We continue
24For example, any attempt to tie-in commodity tax rates to the quantity purchased can easily be
foiled by multiple purchases or asking others to make one’s purchases.
34to assume that the society is comprised of only two groups of people: high- and low-
ability individuals, and that u(·) is a smooth and strongly quasi-concave function, and
increasing in all its arguments. Consider, as in Cremer and Gahvari (1997), an opti-
mal revelation mechanism that consists of a set of type-speciﬁc before-tax incomes, Ij,
aggregate expenditures on goods, cj, and a vector of commodity taxes (the same for
everyone). As usual, homogeneity of degree zero of demands in consumer prices, and
supplies in producer prices, allows us to normalize both producer and consumer prices.
One can then normalize the commodity tax rate on x to zero, deriving the commod-
ity tax on g only. The mechanism assigns (t,cj,Ij), where t is a unit tax on g,t oa
household who reports type j; the consumer then allocates cj between x and g.25
Introduce a type-speciﬁc utility function: uj(x,g,I) ≡ u(x,g,1 − I/wj),j= h,l,
with wh >w l. Given any vector (t,c,I), an individual of type j (j = h,l)s o l v e s
maxx,g uj(x,g,I) (15)
subject to x +( p + t)g = c, (16)
where p is the producer price of g. The resulting demand functions are denoted by
xj(p+t,c,I),gj(p+t,c,I), and the indirect utility function by vj(p+t,c,I) ≡ uj(xj(p+
t,c,I),gj(p+t,c,I),I). Note that these functions are deﬁned for a given value of I and
thus for a given level of labor supply (equal to I/wj).
Assume, as is common in the literature, that at the optimum only the incentive
constraint of high-wage individuals is binding. Intuitively, this means that the tax
policy involves redistribution from high- to low-wage individuals.26 The government’s
25This procedure determines the commodity tax rate right from the outset. A complete solution to
the optimal tax problem then requires only the design of a general income tax function. Observe also
that, strictly speaking, this procedure does not characterize allocations as such; the optimization is over
a mix of quantities and tax rates.
26The single-crossing property (the indiﬀerence curves going through any point (c,I) being ﬂatter
for the high-wage than the low-wage person) ensures that the “upward” incentive constraint is non-
binding when the “downward” constraint binds. This property is guaranteed if c is a normal good. The




l; see Stiglitz (1987).
35problem can then be written as
maxt,ch,Ih,cl,Il vh(p + t,ch,Ih)+μvl(p + t,cl,Il) (17)
subject to vh(p + t,ch,Ih) − vh(p + t,cl,Il) ≥ 0, (18)
πh
h





Il − xl(p + t,cl,Il) − pgl(p + t,cl,Il)
i
− ¯ R ≥ 0, (19)
where ¯ R is the government’s external revenue requirement and μ is a positive number.
Use a “hat” over variables to denote the solution to this problem and deﬁne, for j = h,l,
ˆ xj = xj
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cj, ˆ Ij
´
, ˆ gj = gj
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cj, ˆ Ij
´
, ˆ vj = vj
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cj, ˆ Ij
´
. (20)
The Pareto eﬃcient allocation is given by (ˆ xh,ˆ gh, ˆ Ih, ˆ xl,ˆ gl, ˆ Il). It can be implemented
by the indirect tax ˆ t together with a general income tax.
For future reference, we let
ˆ xhl = xh
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cl, ˆ Il
´
, ˆ ghl = gh
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cl, ˆ Il
´
, (21)
denote the amount of goods x and g that an individual of type h who wished to imitate
a low-wage individual would consume. Corresponding to ˆ xhl,ˆ ghl, we also deﬁne












= vh(p + ˆ t,ˆ cl, ˆ Il), (22)
to denote the maximum utility attainable by an h-type who mimics an l-type person.
7.2.1 Self-targeted public provision
Append the mechanism (ˆ t,ˆ ch, ˆ Ih,ˆ cl, ˆ Il) by giving ¯ g units of good g to anyone who reports
ˆ Il. No one is allowed to resell any part of an allotment, or to top it up. Additionally,
each recipient faces a uniform lump-sum tax of (p + ˆ t)¯ g. The recipients thus end up
consuming ¯ g, as well as ¯ x units of the private good equal to
¯ x =ˆ cl − (p + ˆ t)¯ g. (23)
36The non-recipients’ optimization problem is as before and is given by equations (15)—
(16).
It is plain that if the government sets ¯ g =ˆ gl, the low-ability individuals’ consumption
bundle remain as it was under the initial income tax system. Similarly, the consump-
tion bundle of the high-ability individuals will remain the same, as they will choose not
to participate in the program (they chose their own bundle over the low-ability indi-
viduals’ bundle under the pure tax scheme). The mimickers, on the other hand, will
experience a reduction in their utility level as long as ˆ ghl 6=ˆ gl. Consequently, the pre-
viously binding self-selection constraint (22) slackens and the government will be able
to undertake further redistribution. Observe that no other requirement is necessary
here except for ˆ ghl 6=ˆ gl. However, given that the high- and low-ability persons have
identical preferences, we have ˆ ghl = g
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cl, ˆ Il/wh
´
and ˆ gl = g
³
p + ˆ t,ˆ cl, ˆ Il/wl
´
,
with ˆ Il/wh < ˆ Il/wl. Thus the degree of complementarity between labor supply and g
determines how far apart ˆ ghl and ˆ gl are. The higher the degree of complementarity, the
greater will be the diﬀerence between ˆ ghl and ˆ gl and the more eﬀectual will be public
provision in relaxing the initially binding self-selection constraint.
The above argument shows only the existence of Pareto-improving in-kind transfers;
it does not characterize them. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) catalogue diﬀerent
possible regimes and describe the properties of optimal solutions under each.27 They
show that there exists a regime under which high- and low-ability individuals receive
consumption bundles that diﬀer in (c,I) as well as in g. This regime can be implemented
through a means-tested program where participation in the program is conditioned on
one’s observed income. However, they also show the possibility of a regime wherein
h-a n dl-types end up with consumption bundles that diﬀer in (c,I) but not in g.
This regime implies participation by both groups and the suboptimality of imposing a
means-tested program. This is in sharp contrast with the self-targeting programs with
exogenous income in which participation by both the poor and the rich is never optimal
(as argued in Section 4).
27There are no commodity taxes in their model though.
37Taste diﬀerences between high- and low-ability persons can enhance or undermine
the eﬀectiveness of self-targeting programs. Assume g is normal such that when tastes
are identical we arrive at a self-targeting equilibrium where only the l-types participate.
The h-types prefer to buy a higher quantity of g from private markets than the ¯ g they
can receive for free from the government (alternatively, instead of a higher quantity, one
can think in terms of a higher quality). Now take the same economy but assume that
individuals’ taste for g and ability are positively correlated. Consider the position of the
mimicker in this latter economy at the self-targeting equilibrium of the former economy
with identical tastes. The mimicker’s valuation of the h-types’ bundle, relative to the
l-types’ bundle, must now be higher (because the h-types’ original bundle contains more
g, the good the mimicker now values more). Consequently, the value of vh−vhl increases
and the binding self-selection constraint vh = vhl at the equilibrium with identical tastes
slackens. One can then eﬀect more redistribution by increasing g from ¯ g. On the other
hand, assume a negative correlation between taste for g and ability. The mimicker would
now strictly prefer the original l-types’ bundle to the original h-types’ bundle (because
it contains less g). To prevent mimicking, the amount of g that is being provided should
now be reduced.28
7.2.2 Universal public provision
Amend the mechanism (ˆ t,ˆ ch, ˆ Ih,ˆ cl, ˆ Il) by adding a universal in-kind transfer program
that provides ¯ g units of good g to individuals of both types. The good cannot be resold,
and the programs impose a uniform lump-sum tax of (p+ˆ t)¯ g on everyone who receives
¯ g.G i v e n(ˆ t,ˆ c, ˆ I) and ¯ g, the individual of type j = h,j, will now solve
maxx,g uj(x,g, ˆ I ) (24)
subject to x +( p + ˆ t)(g − ¯ g)=ˆ c − (p + ˆ t)¯ g ≡ c, (25)
g ≥ ¯ g. (26)
28Cremer and Gahvari (2002) discuss nonlinear pricing in a model where tastes and abilities are
correlated.
38The problem (24)—(26) imposes a minimum consumption level for g on the participants.
It may then be possible to manipulate this restriction in such a way as to relax the
binding self-selection constraint of the original problem (17)—(19) and to eﬀect Pareto
improvements. Cremer and Gahvari (1997) prove that this will be the case provided
that the following relationship holds at the solution to the Mirrlees’ pure optimal tax
problem,
ˆ ghl < min[ˆ gh,ˆ gl]. (27)
The Pareto-improving policy sets ¯ g =m i n [ ˆ gh,ˆ gl] −  ,w i t h >0 and suﬃciently small
to ensure ¯ g>ˆ ghl, so that mimickers, but not the actual participants, are forced to
consume an amount of g that exceeds their desired level, and further adjusts the tax
policy. It is important to realize that an element of the initial vector of taxes, ˆ t, may
be a subsidy (or a tax) on g.
To shed light on the nature of commodities that satisfy condition (27), consider
high-wage persons who misrepresent their type. They will earn the low-wage person’s
income but will work less. High and low-wage persons have, by assumption, identical
preferences. Consequently, because of their diﬀerent labor supplies, the mimickers’
marginal rate of substitution between x and g will diﬀer from a low-wage individual’s
marginal rate of substitution (at the latter’s desired consumption level). Speciﬁcally, the
mimickers’ lower labor supply results in a lower marginal rate of substitution between
x and g, and thus a lower demand for g, provided that g is complementary to labor.
This is indeed what condition (27) requires. Hence the goods that are complements to
labor are prime candidates for public provision.29
29This result, which requires the satisfaction of condition (27), is general in that it holds regardless of
the number of consumption goods. When there are only two goods x and g, it will always be possible to
eﬀect Pareto improvements through public provision whether or not condition (27) is satisﬁed (except,
of course, if preferences are separable in labor and other goods). This is achieved by supplementing the




l) with the uniform public provision of g at the level g
∗ =m i n [ ˆ g
h,ˆ g
l]+ ,
with  >0 and suﬃciently small to ensure g
∗ < max[ˆ g
h,ˆ g
l]. This policy entails (i) no change in the
utility level of either type and hence aggregate welfare as long as both persons ﬁnd it best to tell the
truth. [One of the two will supplement g
∗, the other one will now consume an amount of g which
exceeds his original optimal level. However, the extra consumption is inﬁnitesimal and the individual









l) is satisﬁed. [In the absence of transfers, this constraint binds
39Finally, our result here points to the general superiority of a universal public provi-
sion program over (linear) price subsidies. Blomquist and Christiansen (1998a) compare
two suboptimal conﬁgurations when they show that under certain special circumstances
a price subsidy alone may be superior to public provision alone. Their result also requires
that price subsidies beneﬁt high-ability persons signiﬁcantly. Boadway et al. (1998) dis-
cuss the conditions under which the good subject to transfers should also be subsidized
when purchased in the market.
7.3 Topping up or opting out
That targeted and universal in-kind transfers are both welfare enhancing raises an in-
teresting question. How do their welfare properties compare? Blomquist and Chris-
tiansen (1998a) provide some partial answers to this question. However, there are no
general results here. Indeed, there are no general results on the characterization of the
optimal universal public provision policies.
One particular result is that topping up allows taxpayers to achieve a higher, or
the same, level of utility if public provision and labor supply are complements in the
sense that the marginal valuation of g increases with one’s supply of labor. To see
the intuition for this result, assume that initially there is a no-topping-up restriction
in place and that we have an optimal solution with the government providing ¯ g.N o w
relax this constraint and increase the income tax of every new participant by the cost
of purchasing ¯ g, (p + ˆ t)¯ g. It is plain that this change leaves the utility of the new
participants unchanged and the government’s budget constraint in balance. As far as
the initial participants are concerned, they will either remain put (so that their utility
remains unchanged as well) or supplement their ration by buying more (in which case,







l). We showed above that public provision leaves the left-hand side unchanged.
As to the right-hand side, for the same before- and after-tax income, an increase in actual consumption
of g
j over ˆ g
j (whether j = h or l)c a n n o tm a k ei tm o r ea p p e a l i n gf o ra nh to mimic an l type.] (iii)
dR = ˆ tπ
k , where k is the type with the lowest demand for g. Consequently, this policy is Pareto
improving if ˆ t>0. On the other hand, if t<0, a similar argument would show that public provision of
x, at a level “just” above the lowest demand for it, rather than of g, would be Pareto improving. See
Cremer and Gahvari (1997).
40compatibility constraint.
There are two possible initial outcomes. First is the possibility that the initial re-
cipients of ¯ g were the h-types. Under this circumstance, with h-types being the initial
participants, uh will never decrease. As to uhl,w i t hl-types being the new partici-
pants, uhl, like ul, would remain the same. Consequently, we will have either the initial
equilibrium or a Pareto superior one.
Next assume that the initial recipients of public assistance were the l-types. Be-
cause h-types are now the new participants, uh remains unchanged. To determine what
happens to uhl, distinguish between the following two cases: (i) ghl(.) ≤ ¯ g, and (ii)
ghl(.) > ¯ g, where ghl(.) denotes the mimicker’s most-preferred consumption level of g.
Under (i), removing the no-topping-up constraint does not make the mimicker any bet-
ter oﬀ so that uhl remains the same. The new policy is thus incentive compatible. Now
consider the case where initially ghl(.) > ¯ g. Here, removing the no-topping-up constraint
means that the welfare of the mimicker can be improved by consuming more g than the
previous ration of ¯ g. This implies that the originally binding self selection constraint
uh = uhl will be violated at the initial equilibrium because of the topping up. One can
nevertheless show that the initial bundle can be adjusted in such a way as to lead to a
Pareto improvement.
The adjustment takes the following form. Upon relaxing the no-topping up con-
straint and imposing a tax of (p+ˆ t)¯ g on the new participants, i.e. the h-types, levy an
income tax on the l-types as well. The amount of the tax should be suﬃcient to leave the
mimicker indiﬀerent between the new allocation and the self-targeting solution. This is
denoted by δc and determined from the following equality, uh ¡
x
¡
cl +( p + ˆ t)¯ g − δc,p+
ˆ t ),g
¡
cl +( p + ˆ t)¯ g − δc,p+ ˆ t
¢
,Il )=uh(cl,¯ g,Il). This new tax on the l-types leaves
the h-types unaﬀected and is, by construction, incentive compatible. It is also feasible
in the sense that it increases the government’s tax revenue by δc.
What remains to be determined is the l-types’ utility. The complementarity assump-
tion between g and labor supply implies that the l-types’ valuation of g at ¯ g is higher
than the mimickers’. (Recall that the l-types and the mimickers have a pre-tax income
41of Il which implies that l-types supply more labor.) It also implies that relaxing the
no-topping-up constraint increases the l-types’ consumption of g by more than it does
the mimickers’ consumption. Consequently, the l-types experience an increase in their
utility that exceeds the change in mimickers’ utility. Given that the latter change is
zero, the l-types must be better oﬀ.
7.4 Nonlinear commodity taxes and subsidies
Finally, consider the implication of dropping the assumption that only the information
on anonymous transactions is available to the government. Assume instead that per-
sonal consumption levels are publicly observable.30 Given this informational structure,
tax systems will be constrained by self-selection only. The set of consumption tax in-
struments need not then be restricted to be linear; the informational structure allows
them to be arbitrarily nonlinear. This is the framework used by Stiglitz (1982, 1987).
In this case, Pareto eﬃcient allocations can be implemented through a combination of
a nonlinear income tax and nonlinear commodity taxes. Public provision is then unnec-
essary and taxation–including nonlinear price subsidies–is suﬃc i e n tf o rt h ep u r p o s e
of redistribution.
Observe that for this result to hold for all possible preference speciﬁcations, one
requires the availability of nonlinear taxes for all commodities and not just the good
subject to transfers. Cremer and Gahvari (1998) consider a model in which the govern-
ment observes housing consumption at a personal level, but its information on all other
consumption goods relates only to their anonymous transactions. They nevertheless
show that a nonlinear income tax, supplemented by a nonlinear consumption tax on
housing, is suﬃcient for implementation of all (constrained) Pareto-eﬃcient allocations.
The reason they can do this, however, is because they work with a particular preference
speciﬁcation.
Anderberg (2001) also studies a case where only the good subject to transfers is taxed
30There are goods for which this may be a reasonable assumption; examples include housing, and
water and electricity consumption. However, it is hard to justify this assumption for all goods which is
required here.
42nonlinearly, and derives a condition under which this tax and the nonlinear income tax
implement the constrained Pareto-eﬃcient allocation. What makes this possible in his
model is that there is only one labor supply decision; namely, that of participation in
the labor force by the high-ability persons. He assumes that every high-ability person
supplies one unit of time regardless of the wage, and that every low-ability person cannot
work and earns nothing.31
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) too consider a case where the good subject to transfers,
which in their case is education, is taxed nonlinearly. In their model, education is
an input that enhances a worker’s earning ability. Preferences depend only on one
consumption good and leisure. Theirs is a straightforward result from optimal tax
theory. Ordinarily, one does not want to tax inputs. The income tax distorts future
earnings downwards and the education subsidy is used to oﬀset this. With a linear
income tax, the subsidy rate is just equal to the income tax rate. With the nonlinear
income tax, the two are equal at the margin.
8 In-kind programs and labor supply in practice
The preceding section works through a large literature highlighting the theoretical eﬀect
of in-kind programs on labor supply and suggesting that programs that provide goods
complementary to labor are the best candidates for public provision. In this section,
we review the evidence regarding the eﬀects of actual programs on labor supply, and
conclude that it is unlikely that enhancing short-run labor supply is a major reason
that beneﬁts are provided in kind. For one thing, as discussed above, a large share of
in-kind beneﬁts are consumed by the elderly, who are not expected to work. Moreover,
the existence of an old age safety net may cause people to work less at younger ages,
31Anderberg (2001) also characterizes the optimal tax-cum-public-provision policy when the govern-
ment provides Ables and Inﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of the publicly provided good. He further derives
a condition under which public provision to Inﬁrms alone, conditioned on income, along with a tax or
subsidy on the good if purchased from the market, can implement the two-level allocation. The condi-
tion is one of “over-provision” with respect to the market price of the publicly-provided good. Observe
that if the good is over-provided to the Inﬁr m ,i tm u s ta l s ob eo v e r - p r o v i d e dt ot h eA b l em a s q u e r a d i n g
as Inﬁrm. This follows by assumption. In Anderberg (2001), Able and Inﬁrm have preferences over
private and publicly-provided goods such that MRS
AI <MR S
I.
43because they will have less need to accumulate savings (see Krueger and Meyer (2001)
for a review of this literature). The mechanisms through which in-kind programs can
aﬀect labor supply depend on one’s time horizon. Below, we examine the empirical
evidence for health, food and nutrition, housing, and child care in the short and long-
run.
8.1 Short term eﬀects
In the short-run, in-kind programs often have negative eﬀects on labor supply. Com-
pulsory education programs have negative eﬀects because people who are in school are
not working. Other programs have negative eﬀects both through the income eﬀect,
and through the creation of so-called “notches” in budget constraints. Figure 3 shows
a typical notch. In the absence of the program, the budget constraint is AB. With the
program, the constraint is AEDC. Reducing leisure beyond point D leads to an abrupt
fall oﬀ in program beneﬁts, so that there is an extremely high marginal tax rate in the
neighborhood of the notch. As a result, people who would have located at point F, will
work less and locate at point D.
Health: Until 1987, one of the largest notches in the U.S. was associated with
the Medicaid program. Because the income cutoﬀs for cash welfare were the same as
those for public health insurance under the Medicaid program, welfare mothers who
raised their incomes above the cutoﬀ would lose both their welfare beneﬁts and health
insurance. Yelowitz (1995) examines the eﬀect of reducing the notch associated with
Medicaid. As of the early 80s, welfare mothers who went to work would lose public
health insurance for themselves and potentially for their children (often the children
remained eligibility, but the transactions costs associated with applying for the program
increased dramatically when the children were no longer automatically eligible). When
this linkage between welfare and insurance was relaxed so that the children of low-income
women remained insured, labor supply increased in this group. However, Meyer and
Rosenbaum (1999) believe that this is because the expansions of the Medicaid program









Figure 3: Income Cutoﬀs and Notches in the Budget Constraint
In a regime in which private health insurance beneﬁts are tied to employment, in-
creases in public health insurance can also reduce labor supply by lessening dependence
on employment as a means of securing health insurance. There is considerable evidence
for example of “retirement lock,” the idea that some U.S. workers who would otherwise
choose to retire are locked into their jobs by the fear of losing health insurance (Madrian,
1994).
Food and nutrition: Currie (2003) reviews the evidence regarding the labor supply
eﬀects of U.S. food and nutrition programs. One of the diﬃculties in examining the
eﬀects of these programs is that since they are national programs, there is little variation
to empirically identify their eﬀects. Several programs consider the combined eﬀect of
cash welfare (under AFDC, the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children cash
welfare program) and Food Stamp Program (FSP) beneﬁts on the behavior of female-
45headed households. Since most households that received cash welfare also received food
stamps and food stamp beneﬁts are reduced 30 cents for every dollar of welfare beneﬁts,
the combined data oﬀer some purchase on the problem because variation in cash welfare
beneﬁts across states creates some variation in food stamp beneﬁts. Fraker and Moﬃtt
(1988) use data from 1979 to estimate that food stamps reduced labor supply by 9%.
However, they also found that small changes in guarantee levels and beneﬁt reduction
rates had little impact on hours of work. Moﬃtt and Keane (1998) estimate a structural
model of participation in multiple welfare programs, and again conclude that even the
extremely high marginal tax rate in the neighborhood of the notch have relatively little
eﬀect on work eﬀort.
Hagstrom (1996) examines the eﬀects of food stamp participation on the labor supply
of married couples, and ﬁnds that the labor supply eﬀects are even smaller than those
found in studies focusing on single persons. These ﬁndings are consistent with the
literature on cash welfare programs, which also ﬁnds small labor supply eﬀects (c.f.
Moﬃtt, 1992; Moﬃtt, 1998). Hagstrom identiﬁes his model using variation in food
stamp beneﬁts stemming from diﬀerences in non-labor income and deductions (such as
shelter deductions) across households with identical labor incomes.
More recently, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007) use variation stemming from the
county-by-county introduction of the Food Stamp Program in the U.S. to examine its
eﬀects on labor supply. Their point estimates suggest that the FSP has negative eﬀects
on work eﬀort, but are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Housing: Although housing programs are much larger than nutrition programs in
most developed countries, there has been little research examining the eﬀect of providing
housing on labor supply. Notches created by public housing programs create large
potential work disincentives (see for example Giles, Johnson, and McCrae (1997), but
we are not aware of research that shows, for example, that changes in these programs
have eﬀects on labor supply. A larger issue may be whether public housing is in fact
complementary to labor supply. Here the key issue would be whether public housing is
located near jobs or transportation. There is a large literature about “spatial mismatch”
46which argues that some demographic groups have high unemployment rates because they
are geographically separated from job opportunities.
Scholars such as Raphael and Stolls (2002) note that jobs have moved away from
poor neighborhoods so that “spacial mismatch” makes it diﬃcult for the poor to ﬁnd
work. On the other hand, David Ellwood (1986) points out that black and white teens
l i v i n gi nt h es a m en e i g h b o r h o o d sh a v ed r a m a t i c a l l yd i ﬀerent unemployment rates, even
though they face a similar spacial distribution of jobs. Moreover, one’s neighborhood
is a choice, and even though residential segregation is a pronounced feature of most
American cities, blacks also have a history of migrating from areas of low opportunity
to areas of high opportunity. In 1940, 3/4 of all U.S. blacks lived in Southern states,
while by 1970, 1/2 of black men lived in northern cities (Smith and Welch, 1989).
The Moving to Opportunities experiment, which randomly assigned public housing
residents to neighborhoods with low poverty rates, found little eﬀect on employment,
public assistance, or earnings after ﬁve years (Kling, Liebman, Katz, and Sanbonmatsu,
2004). In summary, there is no direct evidence that spending on public housing aﬀects
labor supply (one way or the other), and there is controversy about the extent to which
residential location (which might be aﬀected by housing programs) aﬀects labor market
outcomes.
Child care: Child care may be more likely than other programs to aﬀect contem-
poraneous labor supply, especially the labor supply of young women. Blau and Currie
(2006) summarize 20 studies that examine the elasticity of maternal employment with
respect to child care prices. The estimates are highly variable, but three studies that
account for the possibility of unpaid child care yield estimates that suggest that the
true elasticity may be small. One of the most convincing studies of this question is by
Gelbach (2002) who uses variation in the cutoﬀ age for eligibility for Kindergarten to
identify the eﬀect of free public child care on the labor supply of mothers. Comparing
mothers whose youngest children just missed being eligible for Kindergarten with those
whose youngest children were just old enough to attend, he ﬁnds that a subsidy of this
magnitude (i.e. free child care for at least 1/2 the day) increased labor supply by four to
47ﬁve percentage points among both single and married mothers. The eﬀect of the price
of child care on the intensive labor supply margin is of interest as well. Most studies of
this issue also ﬁnd quite small eﬀects.
On the whole then, there is little evidence that in-kind programs have positive short-
run eﬀects on labor supply that would tend to oﬀset the deadweight losses associated
with the tax system. Child-care, the type of transfer that seems most directly comple-
mentary to labor supply, does have positive eﬀects on mothers with young children, but
they seem to be relatively small.
8.2 Long term eﬀects
On the other hand, many in-kind programs can be expected to enhance the productivity
and labor supply of workers in the future, though with few exceptions (such as Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005)) this is not generally a focus of the theoretical literature. Rhetoric
that describes social programs serving families and children as “investments” suggests
that a concern with long-run productivity and future labor supply could be an important
major justiﬁcation for in-kind transfer programs.32 However, this observation does not
explain why government provides the investments in-kind rather than by giving cash
transfers and allowing families to make the desired investments? This would solve
the problem if families were merely credit constrained, for example. It must be believed
that families would not invest appropriately given the cash. Possible reasons are because
their preferences diﬀer from those of a social planner (e.g. it may be that they do not
take externalities into account, or that they have diﬀerent discount rates), they lack
information about the productivity of investments, there is an agency problem (in the
case of parents who must invest in a child), or some other market failure. In order for it
to be socially eﬃcient to undertake these investments in kind, it must be the case that
they have a larger payoﬀ in terms of future hours, wages, and productivity of citizens
than the equivalent amounts received in cash.
32There are countless examples of such rhetoric. A particularly interesting example is an editorial in
The Hindu, Dec. 30, 2006 entitled “Investing in our Children” which called on government to expand
child feeding and health services.
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the “programs” that has been most consistently shown to increase labor supply, so
perhaps it is not surprising that it is available in all developed countries and in many
developing ones. One might expect job training programs to have similar eﬀects, since
they are, after all, speciﬁcally aimed at improving employment and earnings. But the
large literature evaluating job training programs typically ﬁnds only modest gains in
either labor supply or earnings. Lalonde (1995) argues that this is because we get what
we pay for: That is, given what we know about the size of returns to education, most
training programs are too short and too superﬁcial for it to be reasonable to expect
them to have much impact.
Health: The literature on health and labor supply is surveyed in Currie and
Madrian (1999). Although the estimated eﬀects vary greatly depending on the measure
of health and the identiﬁcation assumptions, the literature does suggest signiﬁcant ef-
fects. Currie and Gruber (1996a,b) show that the extension of public health insurance
to uncovered groups of infants and children signiﬁcantly improved their health. It is
likely that these children will grow into healthier adults, and there is growing evidence
that improvements in health have intergenerational eﬀects (this literature is surveyed
in Currie, forthcoming). For example, Almond and Chay (2003) examine the eﬀect of
desegregating hospitals in Mississippi during the 1960s. They ﬁnd that this improved
the health of black mothers born there in the 1960s, but that it also improved the health
of the children of the aﬀected mothers. There is also a great deal of evidence that unin-
sured adults are less likely to get medical care, including necessary preventive services
(see for example, Newhouse et al. (1993) for a summary of results of the RAND health
insurance experiment) which would have negative impacts on their future health status.
Of course most of the money spent on public health insurance programs is spent on
the elderly. Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2004) examine the eﬀect of gaining Medicare
coverage at age 65 on the health care utilization and outcomes of older U.S. adults.
They ﬁnd that gaining insurance coverage is associated with a narrowing of racial and
economic disparities in utilization of health care. There are increases in hospitalizations
49at age 65, but these are mainly for elective procedures (such as hip replacements).
Individuals also report that they are in better health after they turn 65, especially in
groups who were less likely to have coverage at younger ages, but there is no shift in
mortality trends. It would seem that the major reason for providing medical care to the
elderly has nothing to do with labor supply or productivity.
Food and nutrition: Many nutrition programs were enacted because of concerns
that the health or future health of the work force might be in jeopardy due to poor
nutrition. In the U.S., the World War II draft had revealed large numbers of young
men unﬁt for service because of nutrition-related deﬁciencies such as tooth-loss, rickets,
and skeletal deformities. These types of problems have been virtually eliminated in
rich countries today, though it is hard to know how much of that improvement is due
to in-kind transfer programs, and how much is due to general improvements in living
standards and reductions in the cost of food. Presumably these programs have some
impact on individual’s capacity to work.
Programs that provide speciﬁc foods or nutrients directly to young children appear
to have the largest impact on future potential productivity. For example, in the U.S.,
the Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants, and Children has been shown to
have large and signiﬁcant eﬀects on infant health, and the School Breakfast Program has
been shown to improve children’s test scores. In developing countries, the eﬀects may
well be larger, and visible for adults as well as children. Pollitt et al. (1993) report on a
randomized trial of a nutritional supplementation program in Guatemala that had large
impacts on the test scores and schooling attainment of treated children. The nutritional
component of the Progresa program in Mexico is also estimated to have positive eﬀects
on child health and growth (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2000; Gertler, 2000). In Indonesia,
randomized evaluation of a program to provide iron supplementation to adult workers
shows a signiﬁcant increase in earnings among the supplemented group (Thomas et al.
2004).
Housing: Even housing programs may have some long-term eﬀect on productivity.
William Julius Wilson has argued that the increasing concentration of poor black chil-
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(1987). However, Currie and Yelowitz (2000) show that although children who live in
housing projects generally have worse outcomes than other children, this appears to be
due to selection rather than to living in a housing project per se. They control for the
endogeneity of living in a project by using the fact that families with boys and girls are
assigned larger units, and are therefore more likely to choose to live in public housing,
than other families of similar size. They ﬁnd that children who live in projects actually
live in less crowded conditions than they would otherwise, and are less likely to have
been retained in grade.
Child care: Child care programs that involve early intervention services (such as
Head Start) have also been shown to be an eﬀective way to augment the human capital
of young children. For example, Currie and Thomas (1995) and Garces, Thomas, and
Currie (2002) show that participation in Head Start raised children’s test scores and
their probability of completing high school. Such eﬀects are likely to lead to higher
future wages and are consistent with evidence from “model” programs such as Perry
Preschool or the Carolina Abcedarian program (for reviews of these programs see Karoly
et al. (1998) or Blau and Currie, 2006). Cunha and Heckman (2007) develop a model
of childhood human capital development in which intervention at early ages is most
eﬀective because there are dynamic complementarities; inputs at each stage help to set
the stage for learning that occurs at the next stage.
To summarize, the empirical literature oﬀers some support for the idea that in-
kind transfers to children may be productivity enhancing in the long run. Of course,
whether programs that increase work capacity and productivity will actually increase the
number of hours worked will depend on the income and substitution eﬀects associated
with higher wages. If the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect for low
wage workers, and if programs are targeted to children at risk of becoming low wage
workers, then it is likely that these programs will increase the labor supply of workers
at the bottom of the income distribution. Moreover, even if hours fall, taxable income
will rise in response to an increase in productivity as long as consumption is a normal
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9 Do in-kind transfers change consumption bundles?
The extent to which in kind transfers are “over provided” may shed light on the reasons
underlying these policies. Both paternalism and second best stories involving com-
plementarities with labor supply imply that in-kind goods will be over provided. In
contrast, theories in which goods are provided in-kind in order to improve targeting do
not necessarily imply over provision.
There is little direct evidence on this point with regard to elementary and secondary
education. It seems likely that many households, given the cash equivalent, would in fact
choose to spend it on educating their children, but this is more likely to be the case for
rich households than for poor ones. Thus, universal primary and secondary education
might be regarded as over-providing education for some low income households.
With respect to food and nutrition programs, the answer depends on the program.
Analysts have long argued that Food Stamp beneﬁts ought to be treated like cash
because families typically receive Food Stamps worth less than their food budgets. There
also seems to be a well developed market in Food Stamps. However, Whitmore (2002)
provides evidence that at least some households are constrained by the Food Stamp
program to spend more than they otherwise would on food, but that these households
tend to spend the “extra” beneﬁts on foods that are not nutritious (such as soft drinks).
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007) ﬁnd that the marginal propensity to consume food out
of food stamps is the same as the marginal propensity to consume out of cash income.
In the case of WIC (the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and
Children) and school meals programs, the cash value of the beneﬁts is small (about
$35 per month in the case of WIC packages without infant formula). It seems highly
unlikely that a cash transfer of this size would result in detectable changes in children’s
nutritional status. For example, Currie and Cole (1993) show that the much larger
cash transfers under the old AFDC cash welfare programs had no eﬀect on infant birth
weight. Hence, the fact that these programs have measurable impacts on child nutrition
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parent would choose given an equivalent cash transfer. This is certainly consistent with
paternalism, and perhaps with a second-best argument for in-kind provision if we take
the view that investments in children are complementary to long-run labor supply.
With regard to public housing, most families receiving this beneﬁtw o u l ds p e n d
far more on housing in the private market, so it seems unlikely that the good is over-
provided. Rather, it appears that a low quality good is made available to needy families
in order to enhance targeting.
The case of medical care is complicated, because what is provided is insurance rather
than a particular package of goods or services. Medical care may be under-provided to
some enrollees (those who do not access preventive care, for example), and over-provided
to others (enrollees receiving costly end-of-life care that they may not desire). If we think
of the beneﬁt as insurance, then it is almost certainly over-provided since most enrollees
would not choose to use an equivalent cash transfer to purchase health insurance, even
at a heavily subsidized rate. The growing numbers of people who decline employer-
sponsored health insurance to remain uninsured supports this argument (Currie and
Yelowitz, 2000b - note that most of these people are not eligible for Medicaid).
Finally, programs such as Head Start are likely to over provide child care in that
families who do not have the option to enroll in Head Start generally opt for lower
quality care arrangements than those provided under the program (Blau and Currie,
2006).
There have been few attempts to measure the extent of over-provision. Sonstelie
(1982) provides one example. He argues that because it is more costly to provide a
unit of education of given quality publicly than privately, there is a large deadweight
loss associated with oﬀering public education. His estimates are based in part on a
median voter framework, in which there are three groups: Those who consume public
education, but would prefer that it be of lower quality, those who are happy with the
quality that is oﬀered, and wealthier families who opt into private education because
the quality of public education is too low. The results are likely to be sensitive both to
53this framework, and to problems arising from selection of voters into school districts.
Moreover, if it is the higher cost of unionized teacher wages that drives the high cost
of education, then this transfer of resources from taxpayers to teachers is not entirely a
deadweight loss. Slesnick (1996) oﬀers a more recent analysis of other in-kind beneﬁts.
Beginning with an indirect utility function, he calculates the monetary value of the
welfare gain to recipients of receiving cash rather than several types of beneﬁts. His
data is from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey and spans the period 1961 to 1991.
He considers several broad categories of expenditures and possible transfers. Consistent
with the discussion above, he ﬁnds that the deadweight losses associated with in-kind
transfers of food stamps and housing programs (what he calls capital services) are
small, which implies that most households receiving these beneﬁts are not changing
their consumption bundles because the beneﬁts are received in kind. It is likely that
other in-kind transfers, such as education and medical care, have larger eﬀects.
10 Other justiﬁcations for In-kind transfers
Other justiﬁcations that have been put forward in favor of in-kind transfers include:
10.1 The Samaritan’s dilemma
The Samaritan’s dilemma, introduced in the literature by James Buchanan (1975),
arises when transfers may be given at diﬀerent times. The dilemma is in choosing
between a commitment not to bail today’s recipients out in the future, and letting the
recipients’ current decisions be distorted in anticipation of future transfers. Bruce and
Waldman (1991) argue that such a dilemma arises in the context of human capital
accumulation decisions. Suppose the current transfer recipients are entitled to receive
beneﬁts as long as they are poor. This undermines their willingness to invest in activities
that reduce the likelihood of their being poor in the future. The reason is that they
bear the costs of such investments, but not the beneﬁts. When the investments pay
oﬀ and they pull themselves out of poverty, their future entitlements will be eliminated
or reduced. This realization distorts the recipients’ current decisions, and results in an
54ineﬃciently low level of human capital investments on their part.
One way out, in lieu of a pre-commitment to refuse help in the future, would be for
the government to oﬀer the individuals job training opportunities in the current period,
instead of giving them cash. The conditional cash transfer programs like Progresa, that
were discussed above, can also be seen as a response to the Samaritan’s dilemma. Note
that while the government cares about the welfare of the poor, there is no tension in
the Samaritan’s dilemma model between the government and the individuals in their
valuations of the latter’s lifetime choices. The ineﬃciency to be solved by the provision of
in-kind transfers arises because of the moral hazard problem created by the government’s
lack of ability to pre-commit. Given pre-commitment, the government would have no
qualms about the individuals’ decisions.
Similarly, Coate (1995) argues that the Samaritan’s dilemma provides an eﬃciency
argument in favor of public provision of insurance. The innovative part of Coate’s
argument is that even if the government can pre-commit (not to help the unlucky poor
if they do not have insurance), we may still have an ineﬃcient outcome because of
private charities. As long as individuals believe that private charities would bail them
out in case of a catastrophic accident, they will not buy the eﬃcient level of insurance.
10.2 Redistribution within the household
One hypothesis that has received little attention in the literature is the possibility
that in-kind transfers are an attempt to redistribute within the family from parents to
children, by restricting transfers to items that beneﬁt children more than what would
have been purchased with the same funds otherwise. Why would the government try
to override the parent’s preferences? A classical utilitarian answer could be that the
kids enter separately into the objective function of the social planner and do not simply
enter through their eﬀects on the parent’s utility functions. Fiscal and other externalities
on others (as discussed in Section 8.2 above) could be a second reason. Attempts to
provide equal opportunity is an additional argument that is often made, which is of
course consistent with paternalism.
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The idea here is that the government can lower the price of the publicly-provided good by
pushing its supply up. Cash transfers cannot replicate this. In this way, the government
achieves a policy objective beyond the transfer of resources to the welfare recipients.
Lowering the supply price will hurt the producers of that particular good while beneﬁting
all its consumers (and not just the transfer recipients). As an example, Coate (1989)
argues that shipping food directly to the victims of famine is preferable to giving them
cash because food prices will be lower when food is shipped directly.33
Similarly, Coate et al. (1994) give the example of a developing country wanting to
redistribute from rural farmers to urban dwellers. One way of doing this is to lower do-
mestic food prices. Importing food from abroad and distributing it to urban dwellers,
while taxing them to ﬁnance the program, achieves this. Observe, however, that one is
implicitly assuming here that the government cannot directly tax rural farmers to eﬀect
the same redistribution–a supposition that may be justiﬁed on the basis of adminis-
trative costs or political considerations. The unavailability of certain tax instruments is
thus behind this type of justiﬁcation for in-kind transfers.
Seen in terms of instrument feasibility, the above rationalization is the same as in
previous cases where informational asymmetries prevented the government from levying
particular tax instruments. Consider, for example, the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
theorem; but now assume that some consumers have endowments of certain goods. If the
government could tax these endowments away, then a nonlinear income tax will be the
optimal policy (assuming labor supply and goods are weakly separable in preferences).
In particular, there will be no need for public provision. However, to the extent that
government can tax only market transactions, it will not be able to tax endowments
away. Under this circumstance, increasing the supply of the endowed goods, through a
public provision program, may partially achieve the same goal by lowering the price of
these goods.
33See also Usher (1977) who argues that one can appropriate rents from suppliers of a “socialized”
commodity if the socialization program decreases its average consumption.
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markets. Murray (1983) found that for every 100 units of subsidized housing built, only
75 new units actually came to market. The other 25 units were crowded out by the
public program. More recently, Murray (1999) distinguishes between conventional pub-
lic housing projects and subsidized moderate income housing construction. This study
concludes that conventional public housing has added to the stock of aﬀordable housing
in the U.S. (perhaps because private developers are not interested in this segment of the
market) but that subsidized moderate income housing has had less impact on the total
supply of aﬀordable housing. Pecuniary eﬀects may have also underlain the decision of
European governments to build social housing in the 1950s and 1960s. Following the
destruction of the war, housing was scarce in many areas, and increasing supply was
seen as a way of bringing down the price (Priemus, 2001).
However, the pecuniary eﬀects of government programs may also be perverse. Finkel-
stein (2007) provides evidence that the introduction of the U.S. Medicare program (pub-
lic health insurance for the elderly) has driv e nu pm e d i c a lc o s t sb ym a k i n gt h ee l d e r l y ,
who are the largest consumers of medical care, insensitive to price. The creation of a
class of consumers who are insensitive to price may have also skewed medical research
towards the development of high cost therapies.
10.4 Credit constraints
It is sometimes argued that imperfections in ﬁnancial markets provide another justiﬁ-
cation for in-kind transfers, particularly in developing countries, and especially in rural
areas where access to ﬁnancial markets may be severely limited. High risk associated
with low level of economic activity, complicated legal structure, lack of regulatory su-
pervision, and the like further exacerbate this problem. The result is that the poor
are often unable to secure loans for projects that are proﬁtable and socially useful. In
response, the World Bank and other similar institutions have in recent years attempted
to encourage the establishment and development of ﬁnancial cooperatives and their net-
works in these countries; see Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd (2007). However, the problem
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forced individuals and ﬁrms to rely on short-term borrowing thus exposing them to liq-
uidity risks and impeding their growth; see Berger et al. (2002), Capiro and Klingebiel
(2003), Miller (2003), Berger et al. (2005), Brown et al. (2006), Ortiz-Molina and Penas
(2006), and Sorge and Zhang (2007).
It is possible that credit constraints prevent poor parents from investing in their
children’s education and health. One problem is that parents cannot borrow to invest
in their children using the children’s future earnings as collateral. Without such in-
vestments, it is argued, poverty forms a vicious circle condemning a family’s oﬀspring
as well. See, among others, Benabou (1996), Hoﬀ and Lyon (1995), Fernandez and
Rogerson (1998), Mayer (1997), Mulligan (1997), and Shea (2000).
Credit constraints evidently provide a rationale for providing transfers, but do they
provide a reason for making transfers in-kind rather than in cash? One way to solve
a problem of credit constraints would be to give the family a lump sum transfer. The
reason for preferring in-kind transfers (e.g. public provision of education or a conditional
cash transfers tied to keeping children in school), must be that policy makers suspect
that some families would not spend a lump sum transfer on education. This might be
because there is an agency problem between parents and children such that parents
do not value the return on the investment in children’s human capital as highly as
children would if they were the decision makers, or because families lack information
about the returns to education. Alternatively, it might simply be the case that the
credit constrained household has another, higher valued, project that it would ﬁnance
if it were given a lump sum transfer. For example, in a very poor household, buying
food might be a higher valued project than sending children to school. This argument
suggests that credit constraints by themselves are not a suﬃcient rationale for in-kind
programs. It is also necessary to assume that there are agency problems, or that the
social planner ranks projects diﬀerently than the target households.
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It is well-known that asymmetric information can cause markets to fail, and that in some
cases, government intervention may improve the overall eﬃciency of the economy.34
T h em a r k e tf a i l u r e sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o nt y p i c a l l yo c c u ri nm a r k e t s
that deal with risk, so that government intervention takes the form of social insurance
programs. Other important considerations here are the relative administrative costs
of running these programs under private and public provision, and the ability of the
private and public sectors to circumvent the fundamental moral hazard problem that
arises when people are insured against an adverse occurrence; namely, discouraging the
insured from taking preventive measures. The potential eﬃciency enhancing of social
insurance programs notwithstanding, they are not direct mechanisms for improving the
eﬃciency of transfers between the rich and the poor which is the subject of our survey.
In fact, Feldstein (2005) argues that social insurance programs, as practiced in the US,
have been far from equity enhancing. The academic literature on this topic is vast,
covering issues that are varied and complex enough to warrant surveys of their own.
Accordingly, we limit ourselves to making a few basic observations on the types of social
insurance programs, their aims, and their justiﬁcations.
In most western European countries and the US, expenditures on social insurance
programs are simply huge, dwarﬁng expenditures on other welfare programs.35 The ba-
sic aim of these programs is to provide individuals with some degree of insurance against
the risks associated with inadequate assets during retirement (social security), health
care expenses (public health insurance), permanent job loss (disability and survivor
insurance), and temporary job loss (unemployment insurance).
Consider the social security system. There are a number of reasons why individuals
save inadequately for the future, including myopia and unanticipated expenses. These
34The issue here is one of asymmetric information amongst agents. As we have discussed earlier,
asymmetric information between the government and agents is behind self-targeting and eﬃciency-
enhancing-of-the-tax-system justiﬁcations for in-kind transfers.
35Feldstein (2005) reports that, over four decades ending in 2003, the costs of social insurance programs
in the US have risen from 2.7 percent of GDP to 7.4 percent of GDP while the spending on means tested
programs (except medicaid) has gone up from 1.0 percent of GDP to 1.3 percent of GDP.
59reasons apply to the rich and the poor alike, though the implications of inadequate
savings are more devastating for the poor. Additionally, the poor may save little because
they have a high discount rate for future consumption. In any case, while mandatory
social security may be more eﬃcient than a private system, it is hard to argue that it is a
more eﬃcient way of helping the poor. To justify the latter claim, one must invoke other
reasons like paternalism or the Samaritan’s dilemma (or a market failures such as the
adverse selection which causes a breakdown in private annuity markets). Moreover, the
arguments for and against mandatory social security are more complex because of the
moral hazard the system creates, resulting in depressed private savings and distorted
labor supply decisions; see Feldstein (2005) and Krueger and Meyer (2001).
Besley and Gouveia (1994) present a thorough discussion of private and public pro-
vision of health care. If individuals’ risk characteristics are unobservable, and unevenly
distributed across the population, insurance companies cannot condition their premiums
on these characteristics; instead they will have to set their premiums to cover average
risk levels. This leads to an adverse selection problem that can cause a “death spiral” in
the existing insurance market, in which the good risks select out of insurance, the price
rises, and more people select out until the system collapses. Moreover, if risks become
observable over time, and if insurance companies are unable to commit to the same
rates regardless of the customer’s future conditions, those who are found to be high risk
will be dropped. This latter problem may very well be more acute for the poor, but
to argue that the very high risk persons should stay in the insured pool requires some
kind of justiﬁcation based on paternalism or speciﬁc egalitarianism. Observe also that
lifetime insurance purchases, and who pays for insurance, depend on whether or not
insurance terms change, as new information is revealed over time, to reﬂect the true
costs of insuring high- and low-risk individuals.36
Unemployment and disability insurance raise similar issues. The justiﬁcation for
36Other reasons for government intervention in health markets, include health externalities and the
fact that the market for medical care is monopolistically competitive; see Diamond (1992). There are
also moral hazard problems that cause excessive consumption of medical care. Observe also that the
higher costs associated with excessive consumption may call for direct government intervention; see
Besley and Gouveia (1994).
60public provision rests mainly on the absence of private provision due to adverse selection,
and the argument that public provision may entail lower administrative costs. These
eﬃciency considerations apply to the rich and the poor alike; yet one can think of
a number of reasons that lack of insurance aﬄicts the poor more acutely here. One
way of insuring oneself against disability and particularly unemployment is to resort to
self insurance. This may take the form of one’s drawing on one’s savings, borrowing
from family and friends, or borrowing from ﬁnancial markets. All of these are plainly
less available to the poor. Under these circumstances, unemployment and disability
insurance programs can be considered as more valuable to the poor.37
Finally, we should point out that public provision of social insurance is intricately
related to its implementation through the tax system. This leads naturally to a three
way trade-oﬀ between equity, eﬃciency, and social insurance. Rochet (1991) shows
that social insurance is desirable if risk and earnings ability are negatively correlated;
Cremer and Pestieau (1996), Boadway et al. (2006), and Netzer and Scheuer (2007)
further explore and generalize this result.
11 Political economy considerations
Redistributive policies, in cash or in kind, cannot be imposed on the population in a
dictatorial fashion. If a policy lacks political support, the party which advocates it
will not be elected or returned to oﬃce. In-kind transfer policies must thus satisfy
some type of political feasibility constraint. As one example, de Janvry, Fargeix, and
Sadoulet (1992) examine the political feasibility of speciﬁc food subsidy policies in India
and Ecuador. They construct an “index of the political feasibility of policy outcomes”
based on studies of the “determinants of inﬂuence by groups in civil society and on
37Bailey (1978) is the classic study of optimal provision of unemployment insurance. See also, among
others, Chetty (2006) who extends Bailey’s results to more general settings. Diamond and Mirrlees
(1978) is an early paper that characterizes optimal disability schemes. See also Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2006) who build on Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1978) framework and extend his results to dynamic settings.
This latter paper is an example of a recent literature that appears under the rubric of “dynamic optimal
taxation,” and extends the Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation to dynamic settings. A sample of
other papers in this literature includes Battaglini and Coate (2005), Kocherlakota (2005, 2006), and
Golosov et al. (2006).
61the role of the state in policy making”.38Since the literature is concerned with ensuring
that the political feasibility constraint is met, the policy is usually required to be the
equilibrium outcome of a voting procedure, or of a political game between political
parties and the electorate. The literature has also applied the political feasibility test
to speciﬁc features of transfer schemes such as targeting.
An important shortcoming of most theoretical studies of the political economy of
redistribution, is their reliance on an extremely limited set of policy tools. Since the
policy in question must be an equilibrium outcome of a political process, it is not be
easy to characterize the type of political equilibria that might emerge, or to ascertain
that there will in fact be an equilibrium. This limitation often raises the question of how
applicable the results are to more general settings that allow for more realistic policy
instruments. From our point of view, another limitation of the literature is that even
studies that deal with the level of in-kind transfers often do not explicitly address the
issue of why transfers are given in-kind rather than in cash.
11.1 In-kind transfers as a voting equilibrium
Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) present a model in which individuals vote over the extent
to which public education is subsidized. They show that in equilibrium higher education
will be only partially subsidized, so that those who are credit constrained will not be
able to participate. Thus the middle and upper classes combine to exclude the lower
class from receiving the beneﬁts of publicly funded higher education. Whether credit
constraints are actually an important barrier to higher education is, as we discussed
above, a hotly debated topic (see also Carneiro and Heckman, 2000 and references
therein).
Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Gouveia (1997) study the determination of the
level of expenditures on a publicly-provided good, which is ﬁnanced by a proportional
38They ﬁnd that programs that beneﬁt both the urban poor and the rural rich (such as food sub-
sidies for the urban poor combined with production subsidies for farmers) are the most likely to be
implemented, which may explain why there is an urban bias in food programs in countries such as
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. These policies tend to hurt the rural poor who are actually most at
risk of malnutrition.
62tax levied on a numeraire good, through a majority vote. In Epple and Romano (1996a),
recipients cannot top up the good subject to transfers but can opt out of the system
(as in schools). The authors distinguish between two cases based on whether the slope
of the indiﬀerence curve between public expenditures and tax rate is (i) declining in
income, and (ii) increasing in income. They show that under (i), a majority-voting
equilibrium exists and the median-income voter is decisive. Under (ii), on the other
hand, equilibrium may or may not exist. If it does, it would be of the “ends against
the middle” type with the rich choosing private consumption.
In Epple and Romano (1996b) and Gouveia (1997), topping up of the good subject
to transfers is possible (as in health care). They show that in this case, and given
certain regularity conditions, a majority-voting equilibrium exists. Epple and Romano’s
(1996b) also show that a regime with topping up is majority preferred to one with no
topping up provision, as well as to one with no tax and no public provision. Additionally,
the most-preferred regime entails a higher level of expenditure on the publicly-provided
good as compared to the other regimes. However, the ineﬃciency of this tax regime is
plainly due to the limitation on the tax instruments used. Observe also that the existence
of a majority-voting equilibrium itself, here and in Epple and Romano (1996a), rests
on the assumption that there is only one tax rate in the economy. We know from the
usual existence problem with voting over multiple instruments that these results will not
survive the inclusion of even one other simple instrument such as uniform cash transfers,
which limits their generality.
Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) take a diﬀerent approach and develop a political
economy model which contains the same tax instruments as in the normative models,
consisting of a general income tax and linear commodity taxes. Their procedure yields
a politically feasible and yet eﬃcient solution. However, they pay a high price for
the result in terms of other simplifying assumptions. They assume that taxpayers have
voting preferences that match a social preference speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, they specify
preferences as a weighted sum of the utility functions of diﬀerent consumer types in the
economy, diﬀering from one voter to another only on the basis of the weights each
63assigns to diﬀerent consumer types. Furthermore, the authors restrict the number of
consumer types to two. This implies that their problem takes the form of voting over a
one dimensional issue with single-peaked preferences so that a Condorcet winner exists.
Bearse et al. (2000) do attempt to show why poorer countries spend a larger fraction
of their expenditures on in-kind rather than on cash transfers. Their argument is that
in-kind transfers are of very poor quality in poorer countries because they do not have
a good tax collection technology. As a result, in poor countries, the rich will not partic-
ipate in in-kind transfer schemes. This makes these programs more redistributive, and
encourages the median voter to allocate a larger fraction of the government expenditures
to in-kind transfers.
11.2 Targeting as a voting equilibrium outcome
The question of interest here is whether or not targeting undermines the political support
for in-kind transfers. Gelbach and Pritchett (2003) consider a model in which the policy
maker chooses the degree of targeting and then taxpayers vote on the tax rate (the
proceeds of which goes to ﬁnance the transfers). In their model, there are three types of
workers and three types of jobs; targeting is based on the workers’ occupational choice;
taxation does not distort the workers’ labor supply decisions; and as tax rates become
too high workers simply switch to the untaxed sector. They show that in this setting
the equilibrium tax rate decreases with the degree of targeting. More strikingly, they
show that as targeting increases, total equilibrium transfers decrease and that both the
poor and the middle class agents become worse oﬀ.
De Donder and Hindriks (1998) also show that targeting erodes political support
for redistributive programs. They consider a more conventional model of labor supply
with many types of workers, where targeting is modeled by a reduction in beneﬁts as
income increases. Their result is that, up to a critical level, the increased degree of
targeting does not hurt the poor as the median voter opts for a higher tax rate. When
the critical level is reached, redistribution loses its political support altogether and the
64median voter chooses a zero tax rate.39 In their example, the critical level is reached at
a point where nearly three quarters of the population continue to receive beneﬁts. This
implies that the degree of targeting is not that high before the redistributive program
loses its political support. Sabbarao et al. (1997) describe examples of this type from Sri
Lanka and Columbia, where narrowly targeted programs were opposed by the middle
class, and thus vulnerable when there were changes in the government.
De Donder and Hindriks (1998) also discuss simultaneous voting over tax and tar-
geting rates. In this, they rely on a particular “bipartisan electoral competition” game
between two parties and the voters, using the uncovered set and the minimax set as the
solution concepts. They show that this procedure is favorable to the poor in that they
can, by successive formation of a majority coalition with the rich to increase targeting
and with the poor to increase taxation, converge to their most-preferred policy.
The actual relationship between targeting and political support for transfers is likely
to be more complex. In the U.S., cash transfers to welfare mothers were initially subject
to a good deal of oversight and discretion by social workers. This reassured taxpayers
that only the “deserving poor” were receiving transfers. However, social changes in the
1960s (such as the Civil Rights movement) led to the elimination of discretion on the
part of social workers, and the substitution of a system in which anyone who met a set
of rules was entitled to beneﬁts. The caseload increased and support, in the form of
real beneﬁt levels, decreased until the mid-1990s when the whole system was eliminated
and replaced with one that emphasizes that welfare mothers are expected to work, and
may only receive beneﬁts temporarily. The problem seemed to be a loss of conﬁdence
in the ability of the system to target “deserving” recipients.
39If the degree of targeting is very low, all taxpayers are eﬀectively on the same linear income tax
schedule with a marginal tax rate equal to the sum of tax rate and the targeting rate. Initially, as the
targeting rate increases from this very low level, the median voter opts for a lower tax rate to keep the
sum of the two at his most-prefered level. However, as targeting increases further, the higher income
people’s beneﬁts are exhausted and the median voter’s preferred tax rate starts to increase. The reason
is that a higher tax rate is, as in Bearse et al.’s model, beneﬁcial to the median voter because it enables
him to extract more tax revenues from those who no longer receive any beneﬁts. There is an upper limit
to this process; however. The increased tax rate also implies higher distortions which, at some point,
oﬀsets the redistributive gains from higher taxes. At this critical point, the median voter suddenly
decides to switch to the laissez faire situation of zero income taxation.
65Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) argue that racism is an important reason
for lack of political support for redistribution in the U.S. since transfers go dispro-
portionately to black families. They argue that while many European countries also
have sizeable minority populations, U.S. blacks are more disadvantaged relative to the
average citizen than most European minority groups. They also argue that political
institutions in the U.S. (such as the primacy of the courts), as well as features such as a
relatively dispersed population, have diluted the political power of the poor in the U.S.
relative to Europe. They conclude that these political features are a more important
explanation for diﬀerences in redistributive policy between the U.S. and Europe than
any diﬀerences in economic structures such as the tax system.
The policy literature often discusses politics as a reason that transfers are supplied
in-kind. For example, in the debate over welfare reform in the U.S., there were proposals
to “cash out” the Food Stamp Program (FSP). However, these proposals were resisted by
an unlikely coalition of agricultural interests (who have always supported the program)
and advocates for the poor, and the program escaped the radical restructuring that
befell the cash transfer program (see Currie, 2006 for a discussion of events surrounding
welfare reform, including the discussion of "cash out" of the FSP). By focusing on
particular goods, in-kind programs create political constituencies in addition to those
who are the recipients of the transfers. Political arguments are also used to justify the
appeal of universal in-kind transfer programs.
12 Conclusions
Theory and empirical work often evolve along separate paths. In this essay, we have tried
to bring the theory and empirical work regarding in-kind transfers together. Although
the two strands of the literature are not closely connected, it is still possible to draw
some broad conclusions about the likely reasons why transfers are provided in-kind.
First, paternalism and externalities remain a strong candidate explanation. Second,
although there is a large literature on self-targeting this does not seem to be a major
justiﬁcation for the bulk of spending on in-kind programs. Most in-kind programs are
66not self-targeted, and in fact considerable expense is incurred targeting these programs.
Some of the more onerous rules regarding program participation can be interpreted as
attempts to increase the extent to which the programs are self-targeted. However, these
rules often have the perverse eﬀect of screening out the most disadvantaged among
the people the transfers are intended to help; hence they may actually reduce the ef-
fectiveness of targeting rather than increasing it. The empirical literature about take
up suggests that people are very sensitive to the costs of participation, so that small
changes in the rules may have large eﬀects on participation.
Another large literature explains in-kind transfers as a way to reduce the labor-
supply distortions of the tax system. However, this argument is contradicted by the
observation that the bulk of such transfers are made to individuals who do not supply
labor. Moreover, the design of many in-kind programs creates large “notches” which
cause considerable labor supply disincentives. Still, the labor supply explanation may
apply to some speciﬁc programs such as child care (though empirical estimates suggest
that the labor supply eﬀects of existing programs are generally small). It is also likely
that many in-kind programs for families with children, such as those that supply primary
and secondary education, nutritional supplements, medical care, and child care, increase
productivity and labor supply in the long run. This “investment” role for in-kind
transfers may provide a more important reason to supply transfers in-kind, though it
has not been a focus of the theoretical literature.
Many other explanations for in-kind transfers have been proposed. The Samaritan’s
dilemma is an attractive possibility that is not obviously controverted by the evidence.
Pecuniary eﬀects may be important justiﬁcations for some types of programs, especially
those increasing the supply of housing. We have argued that credit constraints alone
do not provide a very satisfactory explanation for in-kind transfers, though they do
provide a rationale for redistribution more generally. A very large literature discusses
asymmetric information and the related topic of social insurance. We have not tried to
summarize this literature here, but only pointed to some useful surveys of it.
Politics are often proposed as a reason why transfers are oﬀered in-kind. This seems
67like a promising potential explanation, though the existing theoretical work tends to
posit a very limited set of policy instruments, to ignore the distinction between cash
and in-kind transfers, or to take the existence of an in-kind transfer as given and examine
the size of the transfer. It would be interesting to see, for example, more work examining
the relationship between the share of transfers provided in kind and the political fortunes
of various constituencies.
Other avenues for future research include an integration of tagging into the study
of in-kind transfers. Our understanding of tagging has not advanced beyond Akerlof’s
(1978) classic paper. He showed, through an example, that using exogenous character-
istics that are imperfectly correlated with skills will be useful for the design of redistrib-
utive policies. However, the literature contains no general results on this. For example,
suppose the proportions of high-skilled and low-skilled workers diﬀer in two regions.
Although one would want to redistribute from the rich region to the poor region, it is
not clear how this should be done or even which region should have a more progressive
tax system. The prima facie case for tagging becomes even less compelling when the
targeting indicators are not truly immutable, as they then lead to moral hazard issues:
Programs designed to help families with dependent children may encourage families to
have more children than they otherwise would; and programs to help female-headed
households may encourage families to split up. There may be less of a moral hazard
problem in programs for assistance to the handicapped, but in many cases it may be
very costly to establish one’s handicap. Moreover, even when characteristics, such as
race, are immutable, the empirical evidence suggests that tying beneﬁts to these char-
acteristics can result in a loss of political support for transfer programs. There are also
moral and philosophical issues here pertaining to “horizontal equity”.
Programs with or without the possibility of topping up have diﬀerent welfare prop-
erties. Currently, there are no general results regarding the relative merits of the two.
The political economy considerations that make a society to opt for one or the other
program also needs further research. Nor are there any general results on the char-
acterization of the optimal public provision policies, targeted or universal. One other
68consideration is the issue of heterogeneity in multiple dimensions (e.g. in tastes rather
than only in earnings power) and its impact on the design of tax transfer policies. Some
recent papers, as we pointed out, have studied this issue in the context of the optimal
tax theory. Its implications for in-kind transfers have been unexplored thus far.
In sum, since in-kind programs are common, it behooves economists to try to under-
stand why transfers are made in kind, and when such transfers can improve the equity
and eﬃciency of the transfer system. It is likely that in this far from perfect world,
there is a legitimate role for in-kind transfers. A better understanding of the underly-
ing rationale for in-kind transfers, and of the way that they work in practice, will be
necessary if we are to properly harness this tool for increasing societal well being.
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87Table 1: Public Expenditures on Four In-Kind Programs, Selected OECD Countries
Active Labor
Health Housing Child Care Education Market
%GDP 2002 %GDP 2001 %GDP 2003 %GDP 2003 %GDP 2001
Australia 6.1 0.1 0.4 4.7 0.1
Austria 7.6 0.1 0.6 5.1 0.1
Canada 6.7 .. 0.2 5 0.4
Denmark 7.3 0.7 1.6 7.3 0.2
France 7.9 .. 1.2 5.2 0.4
Germany 8.4 .. 0.4 4.2 0.3
Greece 4.6 .. 0.4 3.9
Ireland 5.4 0.5 0.2 4.3 0.4
Japan 6.5 .. 0.3 3.3 0.1
Netherlands 5.6 0.4 0.5 4.7 0.4
New Zealand 6.4 0.6 0.4 6.5 0.1
Norway 8.2 0.2 1 7.1
Portugal 6.5 .. 0.8 5.3 0.1
Spain 5.2 0.2 0.6 3.8 0.4
Sweden 7.7 .. 1.2 7 0.2
United Kingdom 6.4 1.5 0.6 5
United States 6.6 .. 0.6 5.3 0.2
Notes: Dots indicate share is less than .1% of GDP.  Child care also includes pre-primary education. 
Education includes primary, secondary, and tertiary.  Active labor market policies include, but are
not limited to job training and search assistance.
Sources: OECD Health Data 2007 - Version, July 07,
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_37407_12968734_1_1_1_37407,00.html
Emil Tesliuc, "Social Safety Nets in OECD Countries," Social Safety Nets Primer Notes #25, World Bank, 2006.
OECD Family Data Base 2007, www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database.
"Babies and Bosses: Reconciling Work and Family Life," Vols 1-4, OECD.Table 2: U.S. Expenditures and Caseloads for Safety Net Programs, 1980 and 2002
Expenditure Expenditure Caseload Expenditure Caseload
Cash  (1980 billions) (2002 billions) (millions) (billions) (millions)
TANF payments 12.0 26.2 10.6 11.1 5.1
Other TANF services NA NA 13.4
Earned Income Tax Credit 2.0 4.4 7.0 35.8 19.8
Total Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 7.9 17.2 4.1 34.6 6.8
SSI for children NA NA [0.2] [0.5] [0.9]
Old Age and Disability Benefits 120.5 263.1 30.9 453.8 46.5
OASDI for Children [10.3] [22.5] [3.3] [20.4] [3.9]
Unemployment Insurance 14.1 30.8 9.9 51.6 11.7
Health Care
Total Medicare 35.0 76.4 28.5 256.8 40.0
Total Medicaid 23.3 50.9 21.6 213.5 49.8
Medicaid (dependent children&their adults) [6.4] [14.0] [14.2] [54.7] [37.8]
SCHIP 3.0 5.4
Nutrition
Total Food Stamps 9.2 20.1 21.1 21.7 20.2
Food Stamps - families with children [5.5] [12.1] [12.7] [11.7] [10.9]
School Lunch & Breakfast 3.3 7.2 14.9 8.4 22.7
WIC 0.7 1.5 1.9 4.4 7.5
Housing
Low-Rent Public Housing 2.2 4.8 NA 8.9 NA
Section 8 & other assisted rental housing 3.1 6.8 NA 20.0 NA
Homeless programs 1.4 NA
Housing Block Grants 1.8 NA
USDA Rural programs NA NA 9.3 NA
Child Care
Child Care and Development Block Grant NA NA NA 7.9 1.8
Head Start 0.7 1.5 0.4 6.5 0.9
Education and Training
Education
Public primary/secondary [101.7] [222.0] [40.9] [448.9] [48.2]
Public post-secondary [25.2] [55.0] [9.5] [81.2] [12.2]
Financial aid [10.3] [22.5] [8.0] [55.5] [17.8]
Job Training 3.2 7.0 1.2 2.1 0.9
Total 817.1 1751.6
For Children (imputing .5 housing) 394.7 784.1
For Children Percent In-Kind 86.5 92.6
Sources:
Green Book
1980 20022004 - Tables 1-9, 1-11, 2-1, 2-2, 3-1, 3-11, 4-1, 7-6, 9-16, 9-26,13-14, 15-11, 15-21, 15-22, 15-24, 15-25, 15-26,
15-27, 15-28, 15-31, 15-33, K-10 and Chart 7-3.
1996 - Table 16-34.
1986 - Tables 7-1, 8-15.
Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
2006 - Tables 232, 243, 265, 277.
1998 - Tables 310.
Annual Statistical Supplement
2005 - Table 8.E2.
Further Notes:
OASDI for Children figures are for 1985.
Medicare enrollment figures are for 2001.
Number of Food Stamp recipients under families with children is estimate based on Table 15-10 that 60% of 1980
recipients had children and 54% of 2002 recipients had children.
Figures for school nutrition programs include only free and reduced-price meals.
The school lunch and breakfast figures may double count the number of children (also note that the Green Book's
lunch table is wrong, replicating breakfast table.
Caseload for CCDBG includes individuals affected by state-only programs.
Public post-secondary figures are for 2001.
EITC caseloads, and housing caseloads are number of families, all others are number of individuals.Table 3: Demand-Side Housing Subsidy Programs Around the World: 1996
Region/Country Type Tenure Dates
Latin America
Chile Grant Owner 1978-
Costa Rica Grant Owner 1986-
Columbia Grant Owner 1991-
Uruguay Grant Owner 1991-
El Salvador Grant Owner 1991-
Paraguay Grant Owner 1991-
Western Europe
Germany Allowance Owner/renter 1955-
Sweden Allowance Renter 1930-
UK Allowance Renter 1970-
Netherlands Allowance Renter 1970-
France Allowance Renter 1948-
Austria Allowance Renter 1960-
Switzerland Allowance Renter 1950-
Norway Allowance Owner/renter 1960-
Finland Allowance Owner/renter 1941-
Denmark Allowance Renter 1955-
Eastern Europe
Poland Allowance Renter 1955-
Czech Republic Allowance Owner/renter 1993-
Slovakia Allowance Owner/renter 1997-
Estonia Allowance Renter 1994-
Latvia Allowance Renter 1994-95
Lithuania Allowance Renter 1994-
Ukraine Allowance Owner/renter 1994-
Russian cities Allowance Renter 1994-
Other
Australia Allowance Renter 1945-
South Africa Capital grant Owner 1996-
Source: Katsura and Romanik, 2002.Table 4: Food Programs in Developing Countries, Types and Extent of Leakages
Type Extent of Leakage
1. Untargeted Food Subsidies
(Egypt (early 80s), Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Brazil) High
2. Untargeted Food Rations (ration shops)
(India, Pakistan) High
3. Targeted Food Rations (ration shops) Low
(Brazil, India)
4. Self Targetting Food Rations
(Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand) Low
5. Food Stamps Targeted by Income Low-Moderate
(Columbia, Sri Lanka)
6. Food Stamps Targeted by Health Status Low
(Columbia, Indonesia, Honduras))
7. Targeted Feeding Programs Low
(Dominican Republic, Columbia, Pakistan)
8. Supplementation Schemes, on-site or take-home Moderate
(India, Indonesia)




11. Rations Linked to Training Program Low
(Bangladesh)
Source: Alderman, 2002.  Leakage refers to the extent to which benefits go to those who are 
not needy.